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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
With the objects of facilitating the creation of business combinations, promoting 
flexibility and enhancing efficiency in the South African economy the legislature 
liberalised fundamental transaction policy under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the 
Act’). Two of the leading reforms were: limiting the court’s involvement in the 
approval of fundamental transactions to specified circumstances, and the introduction 
of the innovative American concept of amalgamations and mergers (‘M&A’). The 
M&A device is a court-free procedure by which two or more companies (‘merging 
companies’), along with their respective assets, liabilities and sometimes 
shareholders are combined into one or more surviving or newly formed companies: 
provided the transaction is approved by a special majority of shareholders. However, 
this policy liberalisation – especially the limitation of court involvement – makes 
minority shareholders particularly vulnerable to abuse and oppression by majority 
shareholders. The liberalisation of fundamental transaction policy essentially 
relinquishes the notion that shareholders possess a vested right in the form of their 
shareholding, and adopts a new approach that the interests of shareholders are held 
subject to the judgement of the collective majority.1 
 
In cognisance of the potential unfairness this policy liberalisation might have 
upon minority shareholders the legislature introduced the appraisal remedy. It is a 
non-fault remedy that gives shareholders, who disapprove of certain fundamental 
transactions, the right to receive an amount, in cash, equivalent to the fair value of 
their shares, which may be judicially determined, from the company. Essentially the 
appraisal remedy acts as a counterweight to the policy liberalisation as it attempts to 
achieve an appropriate balance between: majority shareholders’ need for efficiency 
and flexibility in the alteration and restructuring of their company in order to keep it 
abreast of rapid economic changes; and minority shareholders’ need to be 
appropriately compensated for the alteration or termination of their investment. The 
appraisal remedy, in the absence of general court involvement, has become the 
                                                
1 Maleka Femida Cassim ‘The Introduction of the Statutory Merger in South African Corporate Law: 
Majority Rule Offset by the Appraisal Right (Part 1)’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 1 at 21-2. 
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primary protective remedy for minority shareholders of companies involved in 
fundamental transactions. 
 
The principal contention of this dissertation is that the appraisal remedy is 
ineffective as the primary protective remedy of minority shareholders in fundamental 
transactions. The remedy is ineffective for numerous reasons; however, it is 
predominantly due to the complexity that engulfs both the determination of fair value 
and the requirements of the perfection procedure (the procedure which must be 
complied with in order to successfully obtain appraisal pay-out). These complexities 
make a dissenting shareholder’s pursuit of the remedy exorbitantly costly and time 
consuming, which derogates from the remedy’s appeal. Furthermore, through use of 
the triangular merger structure, it is possible for merging companies to avoid or 
bypass completely the triggering of the shareholders’ appraisal rights; consequently, 
in such circumstances, the remedy is totally ineffective and cannot accurately be 
regarded as a form of minority shareholder protection – let alone the primary form. 
 
 The appraisal remedy, although ineffective in its current form, has the 
potential to rise to the title of ‘the primary protective remedy of minority 
shareholders’: provided the complexity surrounding both the perfection procedure 
and the determination of fair value is simplified. Once simplified, the excessive cost 
and time implications shall be greatly reduced; accordingly making the remedy more 
accessible to minority shareholders and, hence, more effective as a form of 
shareholder protection. This shall give the remedy some weight in countering the 
liberalisation of fundamental transaction policy, which will ultimately draw a fairer 
balance between interests of minority and majority shareholders. Moreover, 
avoidance of the appraisal remedy, through the triangular merger structure, is not an 
insurmountable obstacle: disenfranchised shareholders may make effective use of the 
Act’s anti-avoidance provision, or veil piercing remedy, to vanquish the avoidance 
and regain access to their appraisal remedy. 
 
The dissertation is divided into eight parts. Part II deals with the history of 
the appraisal remedy in the USA and its close link to the M&A device. It also traces 
the evolution of the remedy from serving a quid pro quo and liquidity function to a 
minority shareholder protection function. Part III focuses on the underlying rationale 
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for the introduction of the appraisal remedy into South African company law: the 
protection of minority shareholders from abuse and oppression by majority 
shareholders. Part IV looks at the perfection procedure contained in s 164 and 
indicates some areas of concern. In part V the perfection procedure’s cost, time and 
complexity implications upon the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy are pointed 
out and recommendations are made. Part VI deals with the complexity surrounding 
the determination of fair value and its ramifications upon the appraisal remedy’s 
effectiveness. In part VII the triangular merger structure is analysed as a form of 
appraisal avoidance and the anti-avoidance provision (s 6(1)) and statutory veil 
piercing remedy (s 20(9)) are evaluated as methods of overcoming appraisal 
avoidance.  
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II   THE HISTORY OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AND ITS PURPOSES  
 
Since the appraisal remedy is an entirely new concept to South African law it is 
imperative to look at its history, development and purpose(s) in order to come to a 
comprehensive understanding of it. This understanding shall form the foundation of 
this dissertation, as it provides a good indication of the purpose for which the remedy 
was introduced into South African law: minority shareholder protection. The 
effectiveness of the South African appraisal remedy, as a form of minority 
shareholder protection, can then be thoroughly analysed in the context of M&As.  
 
Although the appraisal remedy has been part of US corporate law for over a 
century the exact purpose it serves remains uncertain and the role that it plays in 
modern corporate law remains elusive.2 It is generally accepted that the remedy was 
introduced with a two-fold rationale: (1) it served as a quid pro quo for the loss of 
shareholders’ right to veto fundamental corporate transactions after corporate statutes 
were amended to allow for majority shareholder approval thereof instead of 
unanimous shareholder approval; and (2) since minority shareholders no longer had 
the right to veto fundamental transactions it served a liquidity function, in the sense 
that it allowed dissenting shareholders a ‘way out’ of an investment that had been 
involuntarily altered by such a transaction.3 
 
When the appraisal remedy was originally introduced fundamental 
transactions, particularly mergers, were engaged in by unrelated corporations and 
were structured so that shares in the acquiring corporation were issued as 
consideration to the shareholders of the target corporation; however, today cash is 
generally used as merger consideration, which permits the elimination or ‘cashing 
out’ of minority shareholders, in mergers between related corporations (‘conflict of 
interest mergers’).4 In the USA merger transactions are commonly used solely for the 
purpose of eliminating minority shareholders. The change in the use of fundamental 
                                                
2 Barry M Wertheimer ‘The Purpose of the Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy’ (1997-1998) 65 
Tennessee Law Review 661 at 661-62.  
3 Ibid at 662-63. 
4 Ibid at 663. 
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corporate transactions requires a concomitant change in the deliberation about the 
purpose the appraisal remedy serves.5 
 
Today it seems that the initial liquidity function attributed to appraisal rights 
has been superseded by a minority shareholder protection function, which 
predominately operates in the context of ‘cash out’ mergers between related 
corporations;6 however, before expounding on this proposition it is first necessary to 
trace the historical roots of the appraisal remedy.  
 
(a) History of the appraisal remedy 
 
In the USA the first corporations were incorporated by specific legislative 
enactments that granted corporate charters. These corporate charters were typically 
granted to corporations that undertook business of a public nature (e.g. construction 
of railroads, toll roads, canals, bridges and mills), which would usually have been 
performed by the state.7 The first general incorporation statute was adopted by the 
state of Connecticut in 1837; however, such statutes only became prevalent in the 
1870s.8  
 
The corporate charters were viewed as creating property and contract rights 
in the corporation’s shareholders, both amongst the shareholders themselves and 
with the state; thus it was constitutionally impermissible for the state to alter such 
rights without the unanimous consent of all the shareholders.9 Accordingly, the 
corporate charter could not be amended and fundamental corporate transactions 
could not be engaged in unless the shareholders unanimously assented thereto – this 
was known as the ‘constitutional dilemma’. The requirement of unanimous consent 
led to a situation where a single shareholder could prevent a corporation from 
effecting an advantageous fundamental transaction. This was a significant 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid at 664 see fn 11. 
8 Ibid see fn 13. 
9 Ibid see fn 14 & 15. 
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impediment to economic progress as it prevented corporations from effectively 
responding to the rapidly changing economic conditions of the time.10 
 
The ‘constitutional dilemma’ was eventually resolved when the states began 
granting corporate charters that contained provisions reserving the states’ power to 
amend the charters in the future.11 If a state exercised this power, even without the 
unanimous consent of the shareholders, it was constitutionally licit since it was 
envisaged by, and did not derogate from, the original contract (i.e. corporate 
charter).12 By the 1870s, when general incorporation statutes became prevalent, the 
practice of reserving the amendment power had become commonplace; thus 
unanimous shareholder assent to charter amendments was no longer constitutionally 
mandated.13  
 
By the time most states had enacted general incorporation statutes the general 
rule still remained that a corporation could not engage in a fundamental transaction 
unless the shareholders thereof unanimously sanctioned the transaction.14 As 
previously noted, this requirement was a significant impediment to economic 
progress since it permitted a single shareholder to veto/block a potentially 
advantageous fundamental transactions. This seemed unjust and contrary to the 
greater good.15 
 
The judiciary began to derogate the unanimous approval requirement by, 
first, allowing majority approval for transactions involving a cash sale of all the 
assets of the corporation if it was insolvent and lacked prospects of profitability.16 
The use of majority approval was then further extended to: sales of assets for stock 
as opposed to cash; sales of the assets of corporations that were not yet insolvent but 
were in financial distress; and finally to the sale of assets of corporations that were 
not in financial distress.17 At this point the sale of a corporation’s assets could 
                                                
10 Ibid see fn 16. 
11 Ibid at 664-65 see fn 18. 
12 Ibid at 665 see fn 19. 
13 Ibid see fn 20. 
14 Ibid at 665. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid see fn 24. 
17 Ibid at 665-66 see fn 25. 
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effectively be used as a substitute for a merger in order to avoid the requirement of 
unanimous approval.18 
 
By derogating the unanimous approval requirement the judiciary also 
transformed the nature of the remedy available where fundamental corporate changes 
were effected without unanimous approval.19 Initially the courts had granted 
aggrieved shareholders injunctions to prevent such transactions; however, they 
became more disinclined to do so and began granting aggrieved shareholders a pro 
rata share of the value of the corporation’s assets.20 Essentially, aggrieved 
shareholders were deprived of their right to prevent the transaction and retained only 
a claim for damages.21 This was the appraisal right in its most primitive form. 
 
The judicial-driven common law developments laid the foundation for the 
statutory resolution of the unanimous approval requirement. A multitude of states 
enacted statutes that permitted fundamental corporate transactions upon majority or 
supermajority approval.22 Shareholders who objected to such transactions were 
granted the right to dissent and receive the fair value of their shares.23 Today, in all 
the states across the USA, majority control of corporate decisions is the norm and so 
is the existence of some form of statutory appraisal remedy.24 
 
(b) Purposes of the appraisal remedy 
 
From a historical point of view it was generally accepted that the appraisal remedy 
was introduced with a two-fold rationale: (1) to compensate shareholders for the loss 
of the right to veto fundamental transactions after majority shareholder approval 
thereof was permitted instead of unanimous shareholder approval; and (2) to provide 
liquidity, or a ‘way out’, to shareholders who would otherwise be forced to remain in 
a corporation that was fundamentally different from the one they had initially 
                                                
18 Ibid at 666 see fn 26. 
19 Ibid at 666. 
20 Ibid see fn 27-28. 
21 Ibid at 666. 
22 Ibid see fn 29. 
23 Ibid see fn 30. 
24 Ibid at 666. 
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invested in – this occurred when shareholders received illiquid shares in the merged 
corporation as merger consideration.25  
 
A further explanation was that the appraisal remedy came about as a result of 
the ‘constitutional dilemma’; however, this ‘dilemma’ was resolved by the states 
reserving the power to make amendments to the charter in the future – this reserve of 
power was initially contained in the charters themselves and then in the general 
incorporation statutes.26  
 
Professor Manning gives another explanation for the introduction of the 
appraisal remedy: it was not adopted with the purpose of protecting the minority, but 
rather to give greater control and freedom to the majority – i.e. to ‘free the majority 
from the tyranny of the minority’.27 Without the appraisal remedy a dissenting 
shareholder’s only remedy was a court-sanctioned injunction, which would 
effectively prevent the majority endorsed fundamental transaction in question.28 
Accordingly, the appraisal remedy provided an alternative to an injunction, which 
permitted the will of the majority to prevail whilst compensating the shareholder for 
the alteration to his/her investment or loss of ownership thereof.29  
 
Professor Manning stated that the purpose behind the introduction of the 
appraisal remedy accorded with the ‘general legal trend’ in American commercial 
law:  
 
‘If one…surveys as a totality the pressure for the appraisal remedy, the judicial 
response to it, and the liberating effect the statutes have had upon management’s 
power, the whole sequence will be recognized as falling into the basic pattern that 
has characterized the evolution of American commercial law during the last one 
hundred years. We are all accustomed to observe…the rolling ground swell during 
this period from a law of fixity to a law of mobility, from a law centring on 
ownership to a law centring on claim, from a law focusing on the individual to a law 
                                                
25 Ibid at 667-68. 
26 Ibid at 668. 
27 Bayless Manning ‘The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker’ (1962-1963) 
72 Yale Law Journal 223 at 228-30. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid at 229-30. 
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focusing on groups. The development of the appraisal remedy parallels the surge 
toward free transfer and assignability in every corner of American law…and the 
general tendency in the corporate field to centre within management all significant 
operational control, and to relegate the shareholder’s claim of “ownership” to the 
status of a fungible dollar claim. For nearly a century, our law has been opting 
consistently for mobility and the will of the group. It no longer seems feasible (or, it 
is significant to note, moral) to permit the objecting individual to stand in the way of 
a transaction approved (or at least not objected to) by a majority (or those acting in 
their name). Probably the courts would have come to the support of the majority’s 
mobility even without the appraisal statutes. The appraisal statutes are only a special 
legislative instance of a general legal trend. The appraisal statutes may be viewed 
either as a bulwark for the rights of the minority, or as a lubricant to speed the spread 
of majoritarianism. Of course the statutes might do both, depending upon their 
administration and their application.’30 
 
These observations seem to have been correct as, in 1994, the American Law 
Institute’s corporate governance project summarised US corporate law as a ‘largely 
unqualified system of majoritarian control.’31 
 
The historical rationales for the appraisal remedy are easily documented; 
however, over the years, various academics have expounded other useful purposes 
that the appraisal remedy might serve. Professors Kanda and Levmore opine that the 
most important purpos  the appraisal remedy serves is the ‘discovery purpose’.32 
They submit that the appraisal proceedings provide a method by which shareholders 
can discover, obtain redress for, and thereby prevent, wrongful behaviour by 
corporate managers (directors) in relation to the approval and structuring of a 
fundamental transaction that triggers the appraisal remedy.33  
 
The ‘discovery purpose’ certainly has an appeal about it, as it is fairly easy to 
initiate since wrongdoing need not be pleaded.34 Once the appraisal proceedings are 
initiated they may be used to ascertain (or ‘discover’) the ‘fair value’ of the 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 American Law Institute ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations’ 
(1994) Part VII at 291.  
32 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 671 see fn 52. 
33 Ibid at 671. 
34 Ibid at 672. 
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corporation, and in so doing corporate wrongdoing may be uncovered.35 Should 
wrongdoing be discovered the aggrieved shareholder might seek redress for such 
wrongdoing;36 however, this may be difficult because the initiation of appraisal 
proceedings results in the revocation of all the dissenting shareholder’s rights – 
besides the right to be paid fair value. Nevertheless the ‘discovery purpose’, by 
focussing on the proceedings instead of the outcome, promotes the larger object of 
minority shareholder protection.37  
 
In a similar vein, Professor Fischel views the appraisal remedy as an ex ante 
check on corporate managers who engage in transactions that appropriate corporate 
value to themselves, at the expense of outside shareholders, through conflict of 
interest transactions.38 Such transactions are generally regulated by the fiduciary 
duties owed to the corporation by the directors; however, the appraisal remedy can 
also monitor these transactions by setting a ‘reserve price’ beneath which a director 
may not acquire the shares of a dissenting shareholder.39 This approach operates ex 
ante in the sense that it gives minority shareholders the confidence that the value of 
their investment shall be protected; thus it encourages investment, which ultimately 
benefits all shareholders.40 Moreover, the appraisal remedy operates as a check on 
corporate managers to structure any proposed transaction in an equitable manner so 
as to minimise the exercise of appraisal rights.41  
 
Since the appraisal remedy was first adopted the nature of M&A transactions 
and their uses have transformed drastically.42 Accordingly, these alterations must be 
taken into account when determing the modern day purpose of the appraisal remedy. 
Initially the remedy was adopted to serve a liquidity purpose. The ‘market out 
exception’43 animated the liquidity purpose: if the corporation’s shares are publicly 
traded the liquidity purpose of the appraisal remedy shall be superfluous since the 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid at 673. Where an insider causes the corporation to engage in a fundamental transaction with 
another corporation they control. 
39 Ibid at 674 see fn 71 for opinion that ‘market out exception’ does not support the purpose of 
preventing insiders from appropriating corporate value. 
40 Ibid at 675. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 676. 
43 See page 45 below for definition of ‘market out exception’. 
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market itself provides the necessary liquidity.44 In 1969 the ‘market out exception’ 
was made part of the American Model Business Corporation Act45 (‘MBCA’), but 
was deleted in 1978 in recognition of the fact that the predominate purpose of 
appraisal remedy had transformed along with the changed uses of mergers;46 
however, it was subsequently reinserted in 1999.  
 
By the 1960s, with the recognition of cash as valid merger consideration, 
corporate management, backed by the majority of shareholders, began to use mergers 
solely as a vehicle to ‘cash out’ or eliminate minority shareholders.47 Clearly 
liquidity was no longer minority shareholders’ primary concern: they received cash 
and were not coerced into remaining in a corporation that had been intrinsically 
transformed; however, their main concern was the loss of ownership of their shares 
at neither the time nor the price of their choice.48  
 
In 1995 Professor Thompson noted that eighty percent of recent appraisal 
cases in the USA involved ‘cash out’ mergers.49 This indicates that the appraisal 
remedy now predominately serves as a check on ‘the conflict of interest of those in 
control of the corporation who are setting terms at which the minority shareholders 
must exit’.50 The shift to create a remedy that is directed towards conflict of interest, 
instead of liquidity, is further evidenced by the numerous amendments to the MBCA 
since 1978.51 Professor Siegel similarly came to the conclusion that the primary 
purpose of the appraisal remedy of today is to provide shareholders a ‘cash exit at 
fair value’ – commonly in conflict of interest transaction that involve the eradication 
of minority shareholders by the majority – and to function as a check on majority 
shareholder behaviour.52  
 
(c) The underlying purpose of the appraisal remedy 
                                                
44 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 677. 
45 Model Bus. Corp. Act (2008). 
46 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 677. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid at 677-78. 
49 Ibid at 678 see fn 93. 
50 Robert B Thompson ‘The Case for Iterative Statutory Reform: Appraisal and the Model Business 
Corporation Act’ (2011) 74 Law & Contemporary Problems 253 at 254. 
51 Ibid at 264. 
52 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 678 see fn 95. 
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The various purposes served by the appraisal remedy may be summarised as follows:  
 
‘(1) [T]o serve as a quid pro quo for the loss of the right to veto fundamental 
transactions; (2) to provide liquidity to keep shareholders from being locked into an 
investment in a corporation that has been fundamentally changed; (3) to remedy a 
potential constitutional problem with statutes that permit a majority of shareholders 
to decide whether to engage in a fundamental transaction; (4) to free the majority 
from the “tyranny of the minority”; (5) to further “discovery” of corporate 
wrongdoing in connection with the approval of a fundamental transaction; (6) 
viewed ex ante, to relieve shareholders from concerns arising out of…problems 
associated with the appropriation of corporate value by insiders; (7) to serve as a 
check on corporate managers; and (8) to assure that shareholders whose investments 
are terminated by a cash out merger receive fair value for their shares.’53  
 
Despite differences in articulation a consistent principle underlies all – except 
purposes (4) and (5) – the above purposes: minority shareholder protection against 
the risk of corporate managers and majority shareholders appropriating corporate 
value to the minority’s detriment.54 Purposes (3) and (4) are not underpinned by this 
principle; however, in the case of purpose (4), there is no way of determining, with 
any certainty, whether the legislators adopted the appraisal remedy out of bona fide 
concern for minority shareholder protection55 or as a pretence to enable majority 
shareholders to proceed with fundamental transactions unencumbered. 56 Essentially 
the one is the concomitant of the other57 and, furthermore, freeing the majority from 
the tyranny of minority veto power is in no way antithetical to simultaneously 
protecting minority shareholders against majority abuse.58 Notwithstanding the 
                                                
53 Ibid at 679. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Manning op cit note 27 at 228-30. However, see page 235, where it seems that Professor Manning 
implicitly acknowledged that the appraisal remedy was introduced to protect minority shareholders as 
he notes that ‘[u]nder most of the statutes, little or no thought has gone into the impact of the claims 
procedure upon the conduct of the corporate transaction’. This implies that appraisal statutes are 
drafted with the minority shareholder in mind and not the majority of the corporation. 
57 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 679. 
58 Ibid at 680. Also see Manning op cit note 27 at 230 where Professor Manning stated: ‘The appraisal 
statutes may be viewed either as a bulwark for the rights of the minority, or as a lubricant to speed the 
spread of majoritarianism. Of course the statutes might do both, depending upon their administration 
and their application.’  
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speculation as to the legislative intent, there can be no doubt that the actual 
manifestation thereof was to provide a statutory remedy to minority shareholders.59  
 
What minority shareholders are being protected from can only be answered 
by recognising the changes that have occurred in M&A practice.60 The original goal 
was to provide liquidity to shareholders who were trapped in an illiquid investment 
not of their making; however, recent US case law indicates that this is no longer the 
primary goal of the appraisal remedy.61 Today the vast preponderance of appraisal 
cases deal with dissenting shareholders that have been ‘cashed out’ of their 
investment by majority shareholders; thus liquidity is not of concern to them since 
they receive liquidity in the form of cash consideration.62 What concerns dissenting 
shareholders is the fairness of the fundamental transaction in question and, 
particularly, the fairness of the cash consideration received. Purposes (5) to (8) aim 
to address this concern.63  
 
Consensus as to the rationale behind the appraisal remedy has been elusive; 
however, after the above consideration of the history and various purposes of the 
remedy it is patent that it is futile to attempt to ascribe a single rationale to the 
appraisal remedy.64 It is clear that the remedy serves a multiplicity of purposes that 
are predominately predicated on the cardinal principle of minority shareholder 
protection in the event of fundamental corporate transactions.65 Furthermore, 
although purposes (3) and (4) may not be predicated upon this cardinal principle it 
does not necessarily mean that they cannot co-exist since they are not diametrically 
opposed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 679-80. 
60 Ibid at 680. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid at 689. 
65 Ibid. 
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III   THE PURPOSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPRAISAL REMEDY 
 
The history of the US appraisal remedy indicates that it is intrinsically linked to the 
M&A transaction; thus any attempt to determine the primary purpose served by the 
appraisal remedy must take into account the policy considerations underpinning 
M&As and the practical utilisation thereof. Thereafter it is clear that the primary 
purpose served by the remedy ultimately depends upon the practical utilisation of the 
M&A device. 
 
Fundamental corporate transactions, including business combinations, have a 
broad impact upon society: they play an integral role in the efficient distribution of a 
society’s resources and, accordingly, involve matters of public interest and policy.66 
Furthermore, fundamental transactions involve significant risk-taking and often, 
where listed companies are concerned, these decisions are not made by the 
shareholders themselves but by directors acting for their collective benefit.67 It is 
thus imperative that fundamental corporate transactions are regulated in order to 
strike an appropriate balance between encouraging economic activity and protecting 
the interests of a company’s shareholders, the economy and society at large.68  
 
In order to achieve the primary objective of promoting flexibility and 
efficiency in the economy69 the Companies Act seeks to facilitate business 
combinations70 and ‘to provide for equitable and efficient amalgamations, mergers 
and takeovers of companies’.71 In pursuit of these objectives the Act extensively 
revised the regulatory regime for fundamental transactions, predominately through 
the introduction of the US concept of M&As.  
 
M&As provide a straightforward, comprehensible and effective procedure 
that permits business combinations through a written agreement – without court 
                                                
66 Ezra Davids, Trevor Norwitz and David Yullis ‘A microscopic analysis of the new merger and 
amalgamation provision in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive South African Economy 337. 
67 Ibid at 338. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Maleka Femida Cassim & Jacqueline Yeats ‘Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers’ in 
Farouk H I Cassim (managing ed) et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 672 at 675 see fn 2. 
70 Ibid see fn 1. 
71 Preamble to the Companies Act. 
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involvement unless specific circumstances arise72 – which has been approved by 
special resolutions of the majority shareholders of all the merging companies.73 The 
M&A device is the manifestation of the principle that majority rule suffices to 
fundamentally alter the nature of a company, as well as the nature of the 
shareholders’ investment therein, without the need for court approval thereof.74 The 
elimination of judicial sanction, as a general requirement for fundamental 
transactions, greatly facilitates business combinations, which assists companies in 
adapting to ever changing business conditions and, in turn, promotes wealth creation 
and economic growth.75 However, the lack of general judicial involvement has the 
potential to make minority shareholders more susceptible to abuse and oppression by 
the majority. 
 
In a traditional merger the assets and liabilities of two or more companies are 
pooled into a single company, which may be one of the existing companies 
(‘surviving company’) or a newly formed company (‘new company’). The former 
situation results in the disappearing of one of the existing companies and the latter 
results in the disappearing of all the existing companies. Merger consideration is 
usually paid to shareholders of the disappearing company as recompense for their 
disappearing shares. Merger consideration may either take the form of shares in the 
new/surviving company or, since the permissible merger consideration is broadly 
defined in the Act, cash.76  
 
The recognition of cash as valid merger consideration permits the ‘cashing 
out’ of shareholders – i.e. the compulsion of their disinvestment from the company in 
return for cash.77 Thus merger consideration is of fundamental importance as it 
                                                
72 Section 115(3)-(6). 
73 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 677. 
74 M F Cassim op cit note 1  at 20. 
75 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 677. 
76 Ibid at 687. Section 113(2)(d) read with the definition of ‘consideration’ in s 1:  
‘ “consideration” means anything of value given and accepted in exchange for any property, 
service, act, omission or forbearance or any other thing of value, including –  
(a)   any money, property, negotiable instrument, securities, investment credit 
facility, token or ticket; 
     (b)   any labour, barter or similar exchange of one thing for another; or 
 (c)   any other thing, undertaking, promise, agreement or assurance, irrespective of 
its apparent or intrinsic value, or whether it is transferred directly or indirectly.’ 
77 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 687.  
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greatly influences the practical utilisation of M&As, which effects the purpose 
served by the appraisal remedy.78 
 
The introduction of M&As represents a significant policy liberalisation that 
favours the efficient facilitation of business combinations, in the interests of 
economic growth, over shareholder interests in the retention of their investments and 
the protection of minority shareholders from majority oppression.79 This liberal shift 
in corporate policy is akin to US commercial law’s preference for majority control.80 
 
The new policy approach is in stark contrast to South Africa’s general 
adherence to English company law whereby shares have traditionally been 
recognised as proprietary rights, which shareholders ought to be able to retain 
without the risk of mandatory disinvestment; however, such rights are not absolute.81 
The proprietary nature of shares is diminished by the permissibility of cash as merger 
consideration: it allows the ‘cashing out’ or expropriating of minority shareholders’ 
investments.82  
 
Under the old Companies Act83 shareholders, in the context of expropriation 
by scheme of arrangement under s 311, had the right to insist on remaining a 
shareholder of a company and could thus not be compelled to disinvest; however, 
under the liberal approach this is no longer the case as it essentially  
 
‘abandons the idea that shareholders possess “vested rights” in the form of their 
investment, and instead establishes the new approach that “shareholder interests are 
held subject to the exercise of collective shareholder judgment”’.84  
 
The policy liberalisation in favour of majority rule raises questions about the 
protection of minority shareholders who dissent from majority endorsed fundamental 
transactions. This is where the appraisal remedy becomes important, as it 
                                                
78 Ibid at 686. 
79 Ibid at 677. 
80 As noted by Professor Manning in 1962. See pages 8-9 above.  
81 M F Cassim op cit note 1 at 21. 
82 Ibid at 20-1. 
83 61 of 1973. 
84 M F Cassim op cit note 1 at 21-2. 
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counterpoises the policy liberalisation by allowing dissenting minority shareholders 
to withdraw the fair value of their shares – in cash – on the occurrence of certain 
triggering events.85 There are two equally important conflicting values in issue here: 
(1) the need to provide flexibility to the majority shareholders to enable them to 
fundamentally alter and restructure the company in order to keep it abreast of rapid 
economic changes; and (2) the need for minority shareholders to be able to retain 
their investment in the company along with their initial expectations of the 
fundamental nature of the company.86 The concomitant introduction of M&As and 
the appraisal remedy reveals the legislature’s desire to balance the rights and 
interests of minority shareholders with those of the majority.87  
 
The appraisal remedy is a no-fault remedy that gives dissenting shareholders 
the right to have their shares bought by the company in cash, at a fair value, which 
may be judicially determined in certain circumstances.88 Since dissenting minority 
shareholders have no general recourse to the courts, to prevent a duly and properly 
approved fundamental transaction, their primary recourse has become the appraisal 
remedy.89 
 
The appraisal remedy is not a general right, as it is only triggered on the 
occurrence of certain triggering events contained in s 164(2): certain amendments to 
the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation that are materially adverse to the 
rights or interests of shareholders of a certain class; disposals of all or the greater part 
of assets or undertaking of a company; M&A transactions; and schemes of 
arrangement. The grant of the appraisal remedy in these limited events recognises 
that they have significant and far-reaching effects for shareholders.90 As noted above, 
such events may drastically transform the essence of the company and, in turn, the 
shareholders’ rights therein.91  
 
                                                
85 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 677. 
86 Maleka Femida Cassim ‘Shareholder Remedies and Minority Protection’ in Farouk H I Cassim 
(managing ed) et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 755 at 769. 
87 Ibid at 770. 
88 Ibid at 796. 
89 Ibid at 678. 
90 Ibid at 796. 
91 Ibid. 
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The South African appraisal remedy has three important underpinning 
objects. First, where the merger consideration takes the form of shares in the newly 
merged company, it provides liquidity in the form of a cash pay out – at fair value – 
by the company; thus, it operates as an ‘exit mechanism’ for shareholders who 
dissented from the merger.92 It prevents a dissenting shareholder from being locked 
into an essentially new company in which the shareholder has no desire to invest.93 It 
is opined that if M&As are predominately used to ‘cash-out’ minority shareholders, 
as it is in the USA, the liquidity purpose shall not be the primary purpose served by 
the appraisal remedy.  
 
Secondly, the appraisal remedy may operate as a restraint or deterrent on bad 
business judgements made by directors: the greater the number of appraisal claims 
the more likely the board is to reconsider its decision.94 Directors will certainly pay 
heed to the number of appraisal claims since appraisal pay-outs may have a severe 
economic impact on a company undergoing a merger, as they may drain the 
company’s cash reserves at a time when liquidity is essential.95  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the appraisal remedy operates as a ‘vital 
remedy for unfairness’ since it gives dissenting shareholders the right to judicially 
challenge the adequacy and fairness of the value of the merger consideration 
received for their shares.96 Eighty percent of American appraisal litigation, as of 
1995, related to the adequacy of the merger consideration received by dissenting 
shareholders.97 As a subset of this purpose the appraisal remedy also operates as a 
check on opportunistic directors who structure fundamental transactions in a manner 
that appropriates corporate value to themselves, or a party related to them, to the 
detriment of minority shareholders – i.e. in addition to the fiduciary duties imposed 
on directors it provides a further remedy in conflict of interest transactions.98  
 
                                                
92 Ibid at 770. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid at 797. 
95 Manning op cit note 27 at 227-34. 
96 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 797. 
97 Wertheimer op cit note 2 at 678 see fn 93. 
98 Ibid at 675; M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 797. 
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 The simultaneous introduction of M&As and the appraisal remedy indicate 
that these two concepts are closely related; accordingly, the regulatory emphasis of 
the Act is on attaining an appropriate balance between the interests of all the 
shareholders: avoiding both majority oppression of the minority and minority 
obstruction of beneficial fundamental transactions.99 Although the appraisal remedy 
serves a variety of purposes, all underpinned by the principle of minority shareholder 
protection, its primary purpose will ultimately depend upon the practical utilisation 
of the M&A device. It shall generally operate as a ‘vital remedy for unfairness’ in 
fundamental transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
99 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 677. 
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IV   THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPRAISAL REMEDY’S PROCEDURE 
 
The appraisal remedy is not a general shareholder remedy, as it is only triggered on 
the occurrence of certain triggering events contained in s 164(2). These events are 
limited to: amendments to the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation that are 
materially adverse to the rights or interests of shareholders of a certain class; 
disposals of all or the greater part of assets or undertaking of a company; M&A 
transactions; and schemes of arrangement. Since M&As and the appraisal remedy are 
intrinsically linked this dissertation uses M&As as the default triggering action.  
 
In order for dissenting shareholders to acquire the right to demand that the 
company pay them the fair value of their shares, on the occurrence of a trigger event, 
the Act lays down a complex appraisal procedure to be complied with. Once 
dissenting shareholders have complied with these steps they are said to have 
‘perfected’ their appraisal rights and are entitled to the fair value of their shares.100 
The necessary steps to perfect the appraisal right are considered below. 
 
(a) Statement of appraisal rights 
 
When a company gives notice to shareholders of a meeting to consider adopting a 
resolution to initiate a triggering event that notice must contain a statement informing 
shareholders of their rights under s 164.101 Section 113(5)(b) requires this notice to 
include ‘a copy or summary of the provisions of… s 164 in a manner that satisfies 
prescribed standards’. Since there is no ‘prescribed standard’ the copy or summary 
must be in ‘plain language’ as defined in s 6(5).102 A ‘copy or summary’ of s 164 
alone will not satisfy the definition of ‘plain language’; hence it will most likely 
constitute a material defect as contemplated in s 62(4) and (5) and will have to be 
ratified accordingly.103  
 
(b) Notice of objection by dissenting shareholders 
                                                
100 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 797. 
101 Section 164(2)(b). 
102 Section 6(4)(b).  
103 HGJ Beukes ‘An Introduction to the Appraisal Remedy in the Companies Act 2008: Standing and 
the Appraisal Procedure’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 176 at 180-1. 
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According to s 164(3) a dissenting shareholder may give the company written notice 
objecting to the merger resolution provided it is given at any time prior to the vote 
upon the resolution. Although this section is permissive – as evidenced by the use of 
‘may’ – it constitutes an essential prerequisite for the exercise of the appraisal 
remedy: s 164(5)(a)(i) requires the dissenting shareholder to have sent notice of 
objection in order to be entitled to make a demand for the fair value of shares.104 
Dissenting shareholders are thus advised to comply with s 164(3) as soon as they are 
made aware of a merger resolution.  
 
The object of this provision, in light of the potential cash drain attendant upon 
appraisal demands, is to alert the company as to the number of dissenters so that it 
may estimate the amount of cash payment required upon appraisal.105 If a large 
number of shareholders are intending to dissent the board may reconsider the merger 
decision before putting it to a special resolution – even after a resolution has been 
adopted s 164(9)(c) makes express provision for the possibility that it may 
subsequently be revoked.106  
 
Section 164(6) permits two exceptions to the notice requirement: if the 
company failed to include a statement of the shareholders’ appraisal rights in the 
notice of the meeting or if the company failed to give notice of the meeting at all. If 
the statement of the appraisal remedy is made but does not satisfy the definition of 
‘plain language’ in s 6(5) it will be defective and, consequently, constitute a failure 
to include a statement of s 164 rights; thus giving rise to a valid exception in terms of 
s 164(6). 
 
(c) Notice of adoption of resolution 
 
Section 164(4) requires the company, within ten business days after the adoption of 
the merger resolution, to send notice of the adoption to each shareholder who gave 
                                                
104 This is further emphasised by s 115(8)(a): ‘The holder of any voting rights in a company is entitled 
to seek relief in terms of section 164 if that person…notified the company in advance of the intention 
to oppose a special resolution contemplated in this section… .’ 
105 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 800. 
106 Ibid. 
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written notice of objection and who has not withdrawn that notice nor voted in 
support of the resolution. If the company fails to provide such notice it suffers no 
adverse legal consequences in terms of the Act.107 
 
(d) Demand by dissenting shareholder 
 
According to s 164(5) a shareholder may demand that the company pay the 
shareholder the fair value for all of the shares of the company held by that 
shareholder provided: (a) the shareholder sent the company a notice of objection – 
subject to the exceptions listed in s 164(6); (b) the company has adopted the 
contemplated resolution; and (c) the shareholder voted against that resolution and has 
complied with all of the procedural requirements of s 164. If a shareholder satisfies 
the above requirements he is entitled to demand that the company pay him the fair 
value for all his shares. By demanding payment the shareholder ‘perfects’ the 
appraisal right.108 
 
M F Cassim notes that the ‘no-appraisal threshold’, which denied the 
appraisal remedy to minority shareholders if the resolution was adopted with more 
than 75 per cent of the voting shares, under the draft Companies Bill,109 has been 
sensibly discarded: it was ‘manifestly and strikingly inappropriate’ in view of the 
underlying object of minority shareholder protection.110 A ‘no-appraisal threshold’ 
draws the balance between the rights of majority shareholders, to effect a merger, 
and the rights of minority shareholders, to ‘opt-out’, too heavily in favour of the 
former as it denies the latter their primary protective remedy; thus a ‘no-appraisal 
threshold’ defeats the purpose of minority protection entirely.111  
 
If one attributes Professor Manning’s primary purpose to the appraisal 
remedy, to free majority shareholders from minority recalcitrance, the scrapping of 
the ‘no-appraisal threshold’ may not be so sensible.112 The appraisal remedy has the 
                                                
107 Ibid at 801. 
108 Ibid at 802. 
109 GN 166 GG 29630 of 12 February 2007, cl 165(4)(c). 
110 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 801. 
111 Maleka Femida Cassim ‘The Introduction of the Statutory Merger in South African Corporate 
Law: Majority Rule Offset by the Appraisal Right (Part 2)’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 147 at 161. 
112 Manning op cit note 27 at 227-34.  
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potential to give dissenting minority shareholders disproportionate bargaining power 
to their number:  
 
‘Ninety per cent of the shareholders may have voted for the merger and the merging 
corporations may be economically sound, but if the market value of the shares is 
substantial, the corporation may not be able to find the cash to buy out the ten per 
cent of the shareholders who did not vote for the transaction and may have to pull 
out of the deal. In such a situation, the appraisal statutes have obviously failed in the 
job of providing simultaneously for a protection to the dissidents and an avenue of 
mobility for the majority.’113 
 
Moreover, the minority’s disproportionate bargaining power may be 
exacerbated further, as appraisal pay-outs may drain the company’s cash reserves at 
a time when liquidity is essential: there is ‘intense activity as a general reshuffling 
takes place in the administrative, productive, and distributional arrangements of the 
combined enterprises’.114 Professor Manning submits that a ‘no-appraisal threshold’ 
solves the problem of disproportionate minority bargaining power.115 Nevertheless, it 
is submitted that M F Cassim is correct, since the South African appraisal remedy is 
underpinned by the principle of minority shareholder protection and a ‘no-appraisal 
threshold’ has the arbitrary effect of denying the remedy to a small group of 
dissenters but allowing it to a large group of dissenters. This arbitrary effect defeats 
the very aim of the ‘no-appraisal threshold’ expounded by Professor Manning.      
 
The appraisal remedy is granted only to shareholders who are entitled to vote 
on the relevant resolution; thus the appraisal remedy will not extend to shareholders 
who are debarred from voting on resolutions in terms of s 115(4),116 nor to 
shareholders who do not hold any voting rights.117 
                                                
113 Ibid at 236. 
114 Ibid at 234. Professor Manning gives an example of this ‘intense activity’: it would be desirable to 
cancel a lease on a now duplicate facility in order to save paying double rent, but the cancellation will 
cost an immediate penalty payment by the lessee to the lessor.  
115 Ibid at 236 see fn 31. 
116 Section 115(4):  
‘For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), any voting rights controlled by an acquiring 
party, a person related to an acquiring party, or a person acting in concert with either of them, 
must not be included in calculating the percentage of voting rights –  
(a)   required to be present, or actually present, in determining whether the 
applicable quorum requirements are satisfied; or 
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A demand is made by delivering written notice to the company within 20 
business days after receiving notice of the adoption of the resolution; or if the 
shareholder did not receive this notice, within 20 business days after learning that the 
resolution had been adopted.118 Such a demand must state: the shareholder’s name 
and address; the number and class of shares in respect of which the shareholder seeks 
payment; and a demand for payment of the ‘fair value’ of those shares.119 This 
written demand must also be delivered to the Takeover Regulation Panel.120 
 
According to s 164(9) a shareholder who has sent a demand in accordance 
with s 164(5) to (8) has no further rights in respect of those shares, other than to be 
paid their fair value. This accords with the approach that the shareholder has 
voluntarily elected to ‘opt-out’ of the company; hence the shareholder should lose its 
rights to future dividends and voting rights.121 Notwithstanding, the shareholder’s 
rights are reinstated without interruption in three circumstances: first, where a 
dissenter withdraws the demand before the company makes an offer, or allows the 
company’s offer to lapse; secondly, where the company fails to make an offer and 
the shareholder withdraws the demand; and thirdly, in the event that the company 
revokes the adopted resolution that gave rise to the shareholder’s appraisal right.122  
 
Section 164(9) raises questions as to the precise ambit of the ‘rights’ lost: is a 
shareholder entitled to bring an action in terms of the oppression remedy (s 163) after 
his rights have been abrogated? It should be noted that s 184(11) of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act123 was similarly worded to s 164(9) and (10); thus 
Canadian jurisprudence may be helpful in the resolution of this issue. Section 
184(11) of the Canadian Act provided: 
 
‘After sending a notice…a dissenting shareholder ceases to have any rights as a 
shareholder except the right to be paid the fair value of his shares as determined 
                                                                                                                                     
(b)   required to be voted in support of a resolution, or actually voted in support of 
the resolution.’ 
117 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 802. 
118 Section 164(7). 
119 Section 164(8). 
120 Section 164(8). 
121 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 802. 
122 Section 164(9) & (10). 
123 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33. 
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under this section, unless the dissenting shareholder withdraws his notice before the 
corporation makes an offer…in which case his rights as a shareholder are 
reinstated.’ 
 
In the Canadian case of Brant Investments Ltd v Keeprite Inc,124 it was held 
that the appraisal remedy was a contingent remedy since the shareholder could 
withdraw his demand and retain his full rights as a shareholder; thus he did not lose 
his rights to the oppression remedy once he had submitted a demand, but only lost 
the usual rights to dividends and to vote. Whether this reasoning is apt in South 
Africa remains to be seen, but it is important to note that the appraisal remedy is also 
contingent under our Act.125  
 
Section 164 does not specifically disallow partial dissent, but reference to ‘all 
of the shares of the company held by that person’ in s 164(5) implies that a 
dissenting shareholder must demand the company purchase all of his shares, 
regardless of their class, and that partial dissent is not permissible.126 This prevents 
shareholders from ‘hedging their bets’ by voting one class in favour of, and the other 
class against, a merger resolution. However, the s 164(8)(b) requirement that a 
shareholder must state ‘the number and class of shares in respect of which the 
shareholder seeks payment’ in the written appraisal demand, and the reference to 
‘those shares’ in s 164(9), implies that the legislature intended to permit partial 
dissent. Partial dissent may be appropriate when dealing with an alteration of class 
rights as contemplated by s 164(2)(a), but it is submitted that for the purposes of 
mergers it is not, since all of a shareholder’s shares, regardless of class, shall be 
effected by the merger transaction. 
 
(e) Offer by the company 
 
Once dissenting shareholders have made their demands the company must send to 
each shareholder, who has sent such a demand, a written offer to pay an amount 
considered by the company’s directors to be the fair value of the relevant shares – 
                                                
124 (1983) 44 OR (2d) 661 (Ont HC). 
125 Section 164(9)(a) to (c) and s 164(10). 
126 Beukes op cit note 103 at 184. 
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determined as at the date on which, and time immediately before, the company 
adopted the resolution that gave rise to the shareholders’ appraisal rights – 
accompanied by a statement showing how that value was determined.127 This offer 
must be sent within five business days after the later of: (a) the day on which the 
action approved by the resolution is effective; (b) the last day for the receipt of 
demands in terms of s 164(7)(a); or (c) the day the company received a demand as 
contemplated in s 164(7)(b).128 
 
(f) Shareholder’s acceptance of the offer 
 
The dissenting shareholder may either accept or reject the offer. If he/she choses to 
accept, he/she must do so within 30 days after it was made or else the offer shall 
lapse.129 If the offer lapses all the shareholder’s rights in respect of the shares are 
reinstated.130 If a shareholder accepts the offer: 
 
   ‘(a)   the shareholder must either in the case of – 
(i)   shares evidenced by certificates, tender the relevant share 
certificates to the company or the company’s transfer agent; or 
(ii)   uncertificated shares, take the steps required in terms of section 
53 to direct the transfer of those shares to the company or the 
company’s transfer agent…’131 
 
The company must pay that shareholder the agreed amount within ten 
business days after the shareholder accepted the offer and tendered the share 
certificates or directed the transfer to the company of uncertificated shares.132 
 
What happens if the company neither pays a dissenting shareholder the 
agreed amount, nor applies to court for an order varying its obligations (see (h) 
below)? Provided the company failed to make an offer or the company made an 
inadequate offer the shareholder has the right to apply to court to determine the fair 
                                                
127 Section 164(11) and (16). 
128 Section 164(11).  
129 Section 164(12)(b). 
130 Section 164(9) and (10). 
131 Section 164(13). 
132 Section 164(13)(b). 
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value of his/her shares and for an order requiring the company to pay him/her the 
amount judicially determined; however, s 164 does not provide for a dissenting 
shareholder to apply to court if the company simply fails to pay the agreed 
amount.133  
 
The shareholder will have to prove a valid contract, for the agreed amount, 
between the shareholder and the company.134 The shareholder may then claim 
specific performance for mora debitoris. Section 164(13)(b) states that ‘the company 
must pay that shareholder the agreed amount…’; thus if the company fails to pay the 
shareholder within ten business days it contravenes the Act. According to s 218(2) 
‘any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any other person 
for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of that contravention’. 
Accordingly, the company will be liable for any loss or damages suffered by the 
dissenting shareholder due to the company’s failure to pay the shareholder the agreed 
amount within ten business days of him/her tendering his/her share certificate.  
 
(g) Court application by shareholder to determine fair value (‘judicial appraisal’) 
 
Section 164(14) provides that a shareholder who has made a demand may apply to a 
court for a determination of a fair value in respect of the shares that were the subject 
of that demand, and an order requiring the company to pay the shareholder the fair 
value so determined, if the company: failed to make an offer; or made an offer that 
the shareholder considers to be inadequate, and that offer has not lapsed. One 
observes that when the appraisal right is invoked, the involvement of the courts is not 
inevitable or automatic, in fact it may not occur at all.135 On an application to the 
court all dissenting shareholders who have not accepted the offer from the company 
at the date of the application must be joined as parties and are bound by the decision 
of the court; the company must notify each affected dissenting shareholder of the 
date, place and consequences of the application and of their right to participate in the 
                                                
133 Beukes op cit note 103 at 190. 
134 Ibid. 
135 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 805. 
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court proceedings; furthermore, the court may determine whether any other person is 
a dissenting shareholder who should be joined as a party.136 
 
The court must determine the ‘fair value’, in respect of the shares of all the 
dissenting shareholders, as at the date on which, and time immediately before, the 
company adopted the resolution that gave rise to the shareholder’s appraisal rights.137 
The Act is silent as to the meaning of ‘fair value’ and does not provide a method of 
evaluation;138 however, the court is given the discretion to appoint one or more 
appraisers to assist it in determining the fair value.139  
 
Besides determining the ‘fair value’ the court must also make an order: 
requiring the dissenting shareholders to either withdraw their respective demands or 
to take the necessary steps to transfer their shares to the company; and requiring the 
company to pay the fair value in respect of their shares to each dissenting 
shareholder who complies with necessary steps to transfer their shares to the 
company – subject to any conditions the court considers necessary to ensure that the 
company fulfils its obligations under s 164.140  
 
It is not clear whether, in terms of the court order, the shareholder has a 
choice to withdraw its demand or tender its shares and accept the judicially 
determined fair value, or whether the court is entitled to make that decision.141 The 
former interpretation is the more literal, but the latter is the most logical and 
reasonable.142 
 
A further concern is that it is not clear what is meant by ‘all of the 
shareholder’s rights in respect of the shares are reinstated without interruption’.143  
In the merger context, it is submitted that it should mean: dissenting shareholders 
will be reinstated to their full rights to be treated like any other shareholder under the 
                                                
136 Section 164(15)(a), (b) and (c)(i). 
137 Section 164(15)(c)(ii); s 164(16). 
138 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 805. 
139 Section 164(15)(c)(iii)(aa). 
140 Section 164(15)(c)(v). 
141 Davids op cit note 66 at 361. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Section 164(10). 
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merger agreement (including receiving cash or other consideration for their shares if 
that is what is provided for in the merger agreement), and not that such a shareholder 
is entitled to remain a shareholder in the company after the merger.144 The latter 
interpretation would often be inconsistent with the intent of the merging parties to 
eliminate all minority shareholders and own 100 per cent of the target company.145 It 
would also be inconsistent with the legislature’s intention to provide for efficient and 
flexible mergers.   
 
If s 164(15)(c)(v) is interpreted to give the dissenting shareholder a choice as 
to whether to withdraw its demand (and be reinstated) or to tender its shares (and 
receive judicially determined value), it would encourage shareholders to dissent from 
transactions and exercise appraisal rights on a ‘no-lose’ basis: shareholders could 
always withdraw their demand and receive the deal price if the judicially determined 
‘fair value’ turns out to be less than they were originally offered.146 If ‘reinstatement’ 
means the dissenter cannot be forced-out then the impact is exacerbated as the 
dissenting shareholder is given three options: stay in, obtain judicial fair value or 
take the offered price by dropping the court proceedings.147 A possible mitigating 
factor is that the court may make a cost order that is adverse to the shareholder.148 It 
is submitted that the Delaware model should be followed: a dissenting shareholder, 
who does not withdraw his/her request for appraisal and accept the deal price, will 
receive the judicially determined ‘fair value’.149 
 
Section 164(15A) gives dissenters a choice, at any time before the court has 
made a determination of fair value, to accept the company’s offer of fair value. This 
is intended to promote settlement; however, it is also susceptible to abuse by 
shareholders.150 
 
                                                
144 Davids op cit note 66 at 362.  
145 Ibid. It will also defeat the purpose advocated by Manning: free the majority from minority 
recalcitrance.  
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. Probably not the intention of the Legislature when one looks at the availability of various 
merger structures and consideration as provided under s 113. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid at 363. 
150 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 806. 
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The Act permits the court to make an appropriate order of costs, having 
regard to any offer made by the company, and the final determination of the ‘fair 
value’ by the court.151 The threat of an adverse cost order may act as a deterrent to 
shareholders. The court has the discretion to allow a reasonable rate of interest on the 
amount payable to each dissenting shareholder from the date the action approved by 
the resolution is effective until the date of payment.152 The underlying purpose is to 
compensate the dissenting shareholder for the loss of the use of its funds during the 
appraisal period.153 
 
(h) Court application by company to vary obligations 
 
If there are reasonable grounds to believe that compliance by a company with a court 
order, or payment by the company of the agreed amount offered to dissenting 
shareholders, would result in the company being unable to pays its debts as they fall 
due and payable for the ensuing 12 months, the company may apply to a court for an 
order varying the company’s obligations.154 The court may make an order that: is just 
and equitable, having regard to the financial circumstances of the company; and 
ensures the person to whom the company owes money is paid at the earliest possible 
date compatible with the company satisfying its other financial obligations as they 
fall due and payable.155 
 
It is submitted that the court should take the agreed amount into consideration 
when varying a company’s obligations: when a dissenting shareholder accepts the 
company’s offer a valid contract comes into existence, which implies the parties 
agree that the offer reflects a fair value.156 Importantly, the court is not determining 
the fair value, but rather varying the company’s exiting obligations in a just and 
equitable manner. 
                                                
151 Section 164(15)(c)(iv). 
152 Section 164(15)(c)(iii)(bb). 
153 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 806. 
154 Section 164(17). 
155 Section 164(17). 
156 Beukes op cit note 103 at 192. 
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If a merger results in the relevant company ceasing to exist, the obligations of 
the company, under s 164, are the obligations of its successor resulting from the 
merger.157  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
157 Section 164(18). 
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V   THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AS A FORM OF 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN LIGHT OF THE COST, TIME 
AND COMPLEXITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERFECTION PROCEDURE 
 
Section 164’s procedure (the ‘perfection procedure’) plays a pivotal role in 
determining the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy as a form of minority 
shareholder protection in fundamental transactions, since its nature effectively 
determines shareholders’ access to the appraisal pay-outs. If the procedure is 
cumbersome, costly and time-consuming dissenting shareholders will most likely opt 
for some other remedy or accept the terms of the merger agreement in spite of their 
unhappiness therewith; however, if the procedure makes the pursuit of appraisal easy 
and efficient dissenting shareholders shall embrace it as their remedy of choice.158 
Prior to analysing the South African perfection procedure, its role must be 
contextualised in relation to the introduction of the appraisal remedy and the 
liberalisation of fundamental transaction policy under the Act. In doing so it is worth 
noting the development of perfection procedures in the USA. 
 
The perfection procedures in most US states are cumbersome, costly and 
time-consuming. At the time of the procedures’ drafting the appraisal remedy served 
a liquidity function and there was great concern over the liquidity drain appraisal 
pay-outs might have upon the cash reserves of a company, which could, if enough 
appraisal claims were awarded at a high enough amount, effectively thwart a 
beneficial merger.159 In an effort to prevent minority shareholders draining the 
company of its liquidity the appraisal statutes contained a series of strict procedural 
requirements that dissenting shareholders had to complete in order to ‘perfect’ their 
appraisal rights (receive cash pay-out for their shares).160 In accordance with this 
purpose  
 
‘[t]hese statutes were strictly construed so that if a shareholder missed one or more 
of these steps, the shareholder lost the right to appraisal and was relegated to the 
consideration specified in the merger [agreement]’.161 
                                                
158 Manning op cit note 27 at 230. 
159 Ibid at 234. 
160 Thompson op cit note 50 at 255. 
161 Ibid. 
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With the introduction of cash as permissible merger consideration in the 
1960s companies specifically began utilising M&As and their cash reserves to ‘cash-
out’ minority shareholders; thus concern over the feared liquidity drain diminished. 
In simultaneity with the new use to which the M&A device was being put, the 
appraisal remedy’s purpose changed from one aimed at providing liquidity to one 
aimed at protecting minority shareholders who had been ‘cashed-out’ of their 
investments on unfair terms; however, in spite of this ‘fundamental shift’ in the 
appraisal remedy’s role, many state legislatures did not, and have still not, adapted 
the perfection procedure to accord therewith.162 Consequently, the original perfection 
procedures’ stringent and intricate requirements are often used by companies to 
ensure that a percentage of the minority shareholders do not pursue their appraisal 
rights and are left with the terms provided by the merger agreement, even if they are 
aggrieved by the terms thereof.163 This greatly detracts from the protection provided 
by the appraisal remedy to minority shareholders.  
 
Similarly to the perfection procedures in most American states the South 
African perfection procedure is cumbersome, costly and time-consuming.164 This has 
the effect of favouring the interests of the company (majority shareholders) over 
those of minority shareholders, which seemingly indicates: (1) a conscious policy 
preference by the legislature favouring the facilitation of business combinations, in 
the interests of economic growth, over the protection of the value of minority 
shareholders’ investments; and/or (2) a failure by the legislature, when looking for 
legislative guidance on the perfection procedure in the USA, to fully understand the 
fundamental shift that the appraisal remedy has undergone there. 
 
The appraisal remedy was introduced as a counterweight to the liberalisation 
of fundamental transaction policy under the Act and, as a counterweight, it has the 
potential to outweigh, or derogate from, the intended consequences of the policy 
liberalisation (i.e. the company may be drained of liquidity to the extent that it is no 
longer economically feasible for it to go through with the fundamental transaction in 
                                                
162 Ibid at 254. 
163 Ibid at 258. 
164 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 807; Davids op cit note 66 at 360. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 34 
question). Accordingly the legislature made the perfection procedure cumbersome, 
costly and time-consuming, in order to discourage dissenting shareholders from 
claiming appraisal and hampering efficient fundamental transactions. If this was the 
legislature’s intention it failed (like many of the state legislatures in the USA) to 
recognise that, in practice, most companies use the M&A device and their cash 
reserves – effectively nullifying the liquidity drain concern – to ‘cash-out’ minority 
shareholders on unfair terms. This failure hampers shareholder access to the remedy 
and effectively makes it easier for a company to ‘cash-out’ its minority shareholders 
on terms favourable to the company. This derogates from the appraisal remedy’s 
effectiveness as a form of minority shareholder protection and gives the remedy a 
feather’s weight in counterbalancing the liberalisation of fundamental transaction 
policy – drastically tipping the scales in favour of the company over minority 
shareholders’ interests.  
 
M F Cassim goes so far as to submit that the entire perfection procedure is 
‘skewed in favour of the company’ and that the inherent imbalance ‘operates in 
favour of the company and harshly against shareholders’.165 It is submitted that as the 
perfection procedure currently stands it does not achieve an appropriate balance 
between the interests of the company and the minority shareholders thereof, 
particularly in light of the minority shareholder protection rationale behind the 
appraisal remedy.  
 
The perfection procedure should be viewed as a balancing mechanism (a 
scale) that attempts to balance the liberalisation of fundamental transaction policy, 
which favours the facilitation of efficient business combinations through majority 
shareholder control, against the appraisal remedy’s principal purpose of protecting 
minority shareholders from being ‘cashed-out’ of their investment on unfair terms set 
by the majority. The perfection procedure, viewed as a balancing mechanism, is 
analysed below and recommendations on how to improve it, in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the appraisal remedy as the primary form of minority shareholder 
protection, are submitted.  
 
                                                
165 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 807-8. 
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The perfection procedure is cumbersome in the sense that it contains many 
complexities and technicalities relating to specific notices and prescribed time limits. 
The prescribed notices are aimed at ensuring that the corporation is informed, at an 
early stage, of the number of shareholders who will seek appraisal: in light of the 
potential liquidity drain appraisal claims might have on the company, the corporate 
controllers (directors and majority shareholders) have a legitimate interest in 
knowing how many shareholders will claim appraisal in order to check the economic 
feasibility of the transaction.166 The time limitations provide a timetable to keep the 
appraisal process moving and prevent undue delay to the implementation of the 
transaction in question.167  
 
It is extremely difficult for a layperson to understand and comply with these 
procedural technicalities; nevertheless the Act requires meticulous compliance 
therewith and anything short thereof results in forfeiture of the appraisal right.168 
Accordingly the procurement of legal assistance, at the attendant cost, is absolutely 
imperative to a shareholder’s chances of successful appraisal pay-out. In stark 
contrast the company suffers no adverse consequences if it fails to comply with the 
procedure. This inherent imbalance in the perfection procedure is particularly 
inappropriate in light of the fact that companies will generally have access to funds 
and, accordingly, legal assistance to ensure proper compliance, whereas minority 
shareholders generally do not, which may result in loss of the appraisal remedy due 
to an unwitting failure to comply with one of the requisite steps.169  
 
Although the underlying purpose of the perfection procedure is to encourage 
and promote settlement between dissenting shareholders and the company, without 
the further delay and cost of judicial appraisal, it draws the balance between them too 
far in favour of the latter; thus hampering the effectiveness of the appraisal 
remedy.170 It is submitted that a more appropriate balance might be drawn through 
                                                
166 Barry M Wertheimer ‘The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair 
Value’ (1998) 47 Duke Law Journal 613 at 708-9. 
167 Ibid. 
168 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 807. See s 164(5)(c)(ii), which requires that a shareholder comply 
with all the procedural requirements of s 164 in order to be eligible to claim the fair value of his 
shares. 
169 Ibid at 808. 
170 Ibid. 
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the introduction of a ‘substantial compliance defence’ or ‘harmless error rule’.171 
This defence or rule allows a shareholder to perfect his appraisal right even if he 
does not strictly adhere to the perfection procedure: provided his deviation therefrom 
is insignificant and there has been no prejudice to the company as a result thereof.172 
This draws a fairer balance, as it still serves the above purposes whilst not denying 
the dissenting shareholder his appraisal right where he has made a harmless error in a 
genuine attempt to comply. In the meantime courts should adopt a flexible and 
lenient approach to dissenting shareholders who fail to comply.173 The introduction 
of such a defence/rule shall greatly add to the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy 
as a form of minority shareholder protection.174 
 
Another problem is that once a shareholder demands the fair value of his 
shares he loses all further rights in respect of those shares, other than to be paid their 
fair value.175 Should the shareholder opt for judicial appraisal, in terms of s 164(14), 
he is only paid at the end of those proceedings;176 thus the shareholder’s investment 
is frozen until the end of the judicial appraisal proceedings and he is effectively 
deprived of the use of his funds.177 Accordingly, the shareholder may not finance his 
appraisal litigation, which creates pressure on the shareholder to settle for the amount 
offered by the company instead of pursuing judicial appraisal.178  
 
Under the MBCA the company is required to effect a prepayment of the 
‘undisputed fair value’ (i.e. the amount the company offers as ‘fair value’ for the 
shares) when the shareholder tenders his shares to the company.179 In the comment to 
the MBCA the following rationale is given for the prepayment requirement: 
 
                                                
171 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 709. 
172 Ibid. 
173 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 808. 
174 It is worth noting that the notion of substantial compliance has been introduced into the new 
Companies Act under s 6(8)(a) & (b). According to this provision if a form of a document, record, 
statement or notice is prescribed by the Act it is sufficient that the document, record, statement or 
notice satisfies the ‘substantive requirements of the prescribed form’.  
175 Section 164(9). 
176 Section 164(15)(c)(v)(bb). 
177 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 808. 
178 Mary Siegel ‘An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal Rights Provisions’ 
(2011) 74 Law and Contemporary Problems 231 at 236. 
179 Ibid at 235. 
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‘Since…all rights as a shareholder are terminated with the deposit of that 
shareholder’s shares, the former shareholder should have immediate use of such 
money. A difference of opinion over the total amount to be paid should not delay 
payment of the amount that is undisputed.’180 
 
Prepayment has two practical effects: first, it identifies the actual amount in 
dispute, which encourages settlement where both sides recognise the amount in 
dispute is nominal; and secondly, it changes the relative balance of power between 
the corporation and shareholders, as it arms the latter with funds to pursue appraisal 
litigation, which, in turn, encourages the pursuit thereof.181 Although judicial 
appraisal may lead to further costs and delays, it should be encouraged for two 
reasons: first, shareholder status ends when the shareholder makes an appraisal 
demand in accordance with the perfection procedure,182 thus he/she should, at least, 
be compensated for the ‘undisputed fair value’;183 and secondly, if minority 
shareholders are ‘cashed-out’, on terms set by the company, it is imperative that they 
are able to challenge the fairness of those terms in an impartial court. If the judicially 
determined fair value is more than the amount prepaid by the company the dissenting 
shareholder is compensated, for the loss of the use of the difference, through an 
award of reasonable interest thereon.184  
 
In South Africa shareholders do not receive prepayment; they only receive 
payment if they accept the offer from the company and tender their shares or, if they 
pursue judicial appraisal, at the end of judicial proceedings. It is submitted that 
prepayment of the ‘undisputed fair value’ shall assist in giving effect to the minority 
shareholder protection rationale underpinning the appraisal remedy, as it will give 
the dissenting shareholders funds to overcome the legal cost implications associated 
with the perfection procedure. This shall make the remedy more accessible to 
ordinary minority shareholders, who do not have large cash reserves, and feel that 
the merger consideration offered by the company is unfair.  
 
                                                
180 Model Business Corporation Act Annotation § 13.24 official comment (1999). 
181 Siegel op cit note 178 at 237. 
182 Section 164(9). 
183 Siegel op cit note 178 at 237. 
184 Mary Siegel ‘Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century’ (1995) 32 Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 79 at 141. 
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The court is given the discretion to award dissenting shareholders, who 
pursue judicial appraisal, a reasonable rate of interest on the fair value, from the date 
that the action approved by the resolution is effective until the date of payment.185 
This is to compensate the dissenting shareholders for the loss of the use of their 
funds during this period.186 An interest award may sufficiently compensate 
dissenting shareholders for the loss of the use of their funds, but it does not assist 
their pursuit of judicial appraisal, as it is only awarded at the conclusion of those 
proceedings; thus prepayment should be introduced since it obviates the need for an 
interest award on the offered amount and simultaneously funds dissenting 
shareholders’ pursuit of judicial appraisal. This accords with the minority 
shareholder protection purpose underlying the appraisal remedy and promotes its 
effectiveness as such. 
 
Another limitation is the court costs of appraisal proceedings. Section 
164(15)(c)(iv) gives the court the discretion to make an appropriate cost order having 
regard to the offer made by the company and the final, judicially, determined fair 
value. Although the discretionary nature of the cost order may encourage parties to 
reach bona fide agreement on the ‘fair value’, without vacuous resort to the courts, 
the prospect of an adverse cost order will most likely discourage shareholders from 
pursuing judicial appraisal.187 The fact that valuation is not an exact science, but 
merely an estimate as to a range of values that may be fair, exacerbates the perceived 
prospect of an adverse cost order: a shareholder may believe that a difference 
between his/her valuation and the court’s one will result in an adverse cost order 
against him/her.188 Uncertainty as to the allocation of costs discourages use of the 
appraisal remedy; accordingly it is submitted that greater clarity is required on whom 
the appraisal costs are to be allocated.189  
 
Under the MBCA – absent conduct that is arbitrary, vexatious or not bona 
fide by the dissenting shareholder – it is presumed that the company shall absorb the 
costs of judicial appraisal; however, if such ‘bad conduct’ is present the court has the 
                                                
185 Section 164(15)(c)(iii)(bb). 
186 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 806. 
187 Siegel op cit note 178 at 242. 
188 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 808. Section 164(15)(c)(ii) provides that a court must determine ‘a’ 
fair value and not ‘the’ fair value. This implies that ‘fair value’ is a range of values.  
189 Siegel op cit note 178 at 239-240.  
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discretion to allocate costs to the shareholder.190 Furthermore, it is presumed that 
each party shall pay their own expert and attorney fees unless the company fails to 
substantially comply with the appraisal procedure or either of the parties acts 
arbitrarily, vexatiously or not in good faith.191 The Delaware statute, similarly to the 
South African one, grants the court discretion on how to allocate the costs of the 
proceedings; however, Delaware case law evidences an adherence to the practice of 
granting cost orders against the company absent mala fides by the shareholder.192 
 
Judicial appraisal costs could easily be divided in much the same way under 
the MBCA or Delaware statute; but the chances of the company bearing the court 
costs, and the expert and attorney expenses of a shareholder, are more likely under 
the MBCA due to the statutory presumption thereunder.193 The cost presumption 
gives dissenting shareholders more concrete assurance as to the allocation of costs 
than the discretionary court allocation thereof;194 hence judicial appraisal becomes 
more predictable and therefore viable for dissenting shareholders.195 The exception 
to the presumption, in the case of bad conduct by either of the parties, also defines 
the parameters within which the court may exercise its discretion to allocate costs. 
The comment to the section provides: 
 
‘[T]he purpose of all these grants of discretion with respect to expenses is to increase 
the incentives of both sides to proceed in good faith…to attempt to resolve their 
disagreement without the need of a formal judicial appraisal of the value of 
shares.’196 
 
The court’s discretion to allocate costs, under s 164(15)(c)(iv), may 
encourage parties to reach agreement in good faith; however, the uncertainty as to 
valuation and the allocation of costs discourages dissenting shareholders from 
pursuing judicial appraisal if agreement cannot be reached. It is accordingly 
submitted that it should be statutorily presumed that the company absorbs the court 
                                                
190 Ibid at 239. 
191 Ibid at 240. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid at 241. 
194 Ibid at 242. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Model Business Corporation Act Annotation § 13.31 official comment (2008). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 40 
costs and, furthermore, that the court be given the discretion to allocate the expert 
and attorney costs where either party commits bad conduct. A statutory presumption 
to such effect shall make judicial appraisal more economically feasible for the 
dissenting shareholder than the current discretionary nature of the allocation of costs 
under the Act; hence encouraging judicial appraisal.197 Judicial appraisal should be 
encouraged, as ‘absent some substantial financial relief…appraisal rights are merely 
a theoretical right for those who own only a small number of shares’.198 Moreover, as 
noted above, if minority shareholders are ‘cashed-out’, on terms set by the company, 
it is imperative that they are able to challenge the fairness of those terms in an 
impartial court.  
 
By drafting such a cumbersome perfection procedure the South African 
legislature has failed to properly synthesise the procedure with minority shareholder 
protection rationale underlying the appraisal remedy, which significantly tips the 
scales in favour of majority shareholders as it makes the appraisal remedy too costly, 
time consuming and complicated for minority shareholders to feasibly pursue. In 
doing so the legislature has failed to utilise the perfection procedure to draw an 
appropriate balance between the interests of majority and minority shareholders. This 
seemingly evidences: (1) a conscious policy preference for the facilitation of 
business combinations, in the interests of economic growth, over minority 
shareholders’ legitimate interests in their investments; and/or (2) a failure by the 
legislature, when looking for legislative guidance on the perfection procedure in the 
USA, to understand the fundamental shift that the appraisal remedy has undergone 
there. Although the cumbersome procedure may have the desirable effect of 
encouraging and promoting settlement between the dissenting shareholders and the 
company, without the further costs and delay of judicial appraisal, it simultaneously 
detracts from the appraisal remedy’s effectiveness as the primary form of minority 
shareholder protection. Accordingly, the above recommendations should be put in 
place in order to achieve a better balance between protecting minority shareholders 
and facilitating business combinations through majority rule. 
 
                                                
197 Siegel op cit note 178 at 242-43. 
198 Ibid at 243. 
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VI   THE COMPLEXITY SURROUNDING THE DETERMINATION OF FAIR 
VALUE 
 
The judicial determination of fair value conjures up a variety of issues relating to the 
choice of valuation methodology, the aptness of minority discounts, whether synergy 
gains should be taken into account and certain institutional problems. These issues 
create complexity and, therefore, impact the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy as 
the primary form of minority shareholder protection in fundamental transactions. It is 
patent that 
 
‘the determination of fair value is the most critical element to the success of the 
appraisal remedy, since shareholders will hardly put the value of their investment in 
a court’s hands if they perceive any inequity or even unpredictability in the 
process’.199  
 
Accordingly, it is of the utmost importance that courts, when determining fair 
value, are cognisant of the minority shareholder protection rationale underlying the 
appraisal remedy.200 The way in which the court appraises minority shares is key to 
the effectiveness of the remedy: if the courts appraise shares in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the appraisal remedy’s purpose it shall become redundant, as 
shareholders will favour other means of challenging fundamental transactions, 
principally breach of fiduciary duty claims, which may be inefficient and more time 
consuming than appraisal.201  
 
(a) Definition of fair value and valuation methodology 
 
Section 164 makes no attempt to define fair value; nevertheless the court is required 
to determine ‘a fair value in respect of the shares of all the dissenting 
shareholders’.202 The position is the same across most of the American states, which 
indicates a general consensus that there is no universally correct way to determine 
                                                
199 Randall M Larsen ‘“Fair” Value? – The Utah Supreme Court Appraises Fair Value for Minority 
Shareholders under the Appraisal Remedy: Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton.’ (1999) Utah Law 
Review 823 at 831. 
200 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 618. 
201 Ibid at 626. 
202 Section 164(15)(c)(ii). 
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fair value as each appraisal claim generates its own particular valuation issues.203 
Accordingly, an attempt to define ‘fair value’ is futile since no single definition can 
encompass the nuances attendant upon the factual circumstances of each judicial 
appraisal.204  
 
The ultimate determination of fair value is strongly influenced by the 
valuation methodology chosen.205 The valuation methodology utilised by the court 
depends on the evidence presented by the parties,206 which takes the form of expert 
appraisers’ testimonies; hence expert consensus determines the valuation 
methodology utilised.207 This accords with ‘open-ended’ approach to valuation 
adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v UOP Inc.208 The court 
stated that the determination of fair value ‘requires consideration of all the relevant 
factors involving the value of a company’, which includes ‘proof of value by any 
techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial 
community’.209 Consequently, the court may take into account market value, net 
asset value, earning prospects, dividends, the nature of the enterprise and any other 
facts that help determine the future earning prospects of the merged company.210 It is 
submitted that South African courts, when determining fair value, should adopt the 
open-ended approach. 
 
Unfortunately the choice of valuation methodology does not eliminate the 
problems inherent in appraisal, as each valuation technique is merely a way of 
estimating the ‘fair value’ or ‘intrinsic value’ of the company.211 Valuation is more 
of an art than a science; thus the valuation given by each of these techniques is 
contingent on the assumptions upon which the calculations are predicated.212 Due to 
the innate subjectivity and estimation involved in valuation the parties’ experts often 
produce substantially different results, even though they both use the same valuation 
                                                
203 Siegel op cit note 184 at 135. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 629. 
207 Siegel op cit note 184 at 135.  
208 457 A.2d 701 at 713 (Del. 1983). 
209 Ibid at 713. 
210 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 809 see fn 247. 
211 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 629. 
212 Ibid. 
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methodology.213 The array of valuation issues has led to appraisal becoming a ‘clash 
of experts’ as noted by the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
 
‘“[W]e take the occasion to comment upon a recurring theme in recent appraisal 
cases – the clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value. The 
presentation of widely divergent views reflecting partisan positions in appraisal 
proceedings adds to the burden of the Court of Chancery’s task of fixing value.”’214  
 
Since appraisal ultimately boils down to a clash of highly paid experts it is 
crucial that the courts are cognisant of the fact that ‘whether consciously or 
unconsciously, the opinions expressed by the expert witnesses significantly reflect 
the desires of their clients’.215 One of the primary institutional issues a court faces, 
when appraising the fair value of shares, is the highly divergent opinions expressed 
by the respective parties’ experts.216 The Delaware courts have dealt with this in one 
of two ways: (1) the court decides which experts’ testimony is more credible and 
then accepts that experts valuation model; or (2), where appropriate, the court 
appoints its own expert to provide an objective presentation of evidence.217  
 
Section 164(15)(c)(iii)(aa) gives the court the discretion to appoint one or 
more appraisers to assist it in determining the fair value of the shares. The 
appointment of neutral experts shall greatly assist the court in critically evaluating 
the opinions of each of the parties’ experts and removing some of the ‘adversarial 
hyperbole’ inherent therein.218 Although the use of a neutral expert may be of great 
assistance to the court, two points of caution must be noted:  
 
‘First, the use of an additional expert imposes additional costs to the proceeding and 
probably increases the time involved to reach a final result. It also adds a host of 
procedural issues associated with the appointment of the expert and how the expert 
will function in the process. The court must be careful to insure that the benefits of 
appointing a neutral expert justify the added time and expense and the additional 
layer of procedure. The second point of caution involves the potential for excessive 
                                                
213 Ibid at 630. 
214 Siegel op cit note 184 at 135 see fn 260. 
215 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 630. 
216 Ibid at 696. 
217 Ibid at 696-702. 
218 Ibid at 700-1. 
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reliance by the court on the neutral expert. The court is charged with the statutory 
responsibility of conducting the appraisal, and should not excessively delegate that 
responsibility to the neutral expert…[since] [t]he neutral expert, in all probability, 
will not have access to the full range of information that will be available to the 
court with respect to the relative equities of the parties’ conduct, or may not fully 
appreciate such information. Accordingly, the court must guard against excessive 
reliance on the neutral expert.’219  
 
(b) Time of the determination of fair value 
 
The only guidance s 164 provides relates to the time at which fair value is to be 
determined. It must be determined ‘at the date on which, and time immediately 
before, the company adopted the resolution that gave rise to a shareholder’s rights’ 
under s 164.220 It is important to note that the reference point for valuation is the 
adoption of the resolution and not the earlier date of the announcement of the 
transaction, nor the later date of the effectuation of the transaction. This does not 
permit the effects of the resolution’s adoption, on the value of the company or its 
shares, to be taken into account. In most American states the position differs to the 
South African position: the time at which the fair value is to be determined is 
immediately before the effectuation of the fundamental transaction to which the 
dissenter objects, and must exclude any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation 
of the fundamental transaction.221 Although the American and South African time of 
determination for fair value differ, they both, essentially, prevent the courts from 
taking into account the synergy gains that might be derived from the proposed 
fundamental transaction. Surely this should depend on whether the shareholder 
opted-out or was forced-out of the company? 
 
The prevention of courts taking account of the potential synergy gains has its 
roots in the traditional appraisal remedy, which sought to provide liquidity to 
dissenting shareholders trapped in a company fundamentally different from the one 
they initially invested in.222 When a shareholder dissented he voluntarily elected to 
                                                
219 Ibid at 701-2. 
220 Section 164(16). 
221 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 627. 
222 Ibid at 660. 
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be bought out rather than participate in the newly merged company; thus, on the 
basis of estoppel, the synergy gains were not taken into account in the determination 
of the fair value of that shareholder’s shares.223  
 
As pointed out on numerous occasions in this dissertation, the underlying 
purpose of the appraisal remedy has changed in concomitance with the altered uses 
of the M&A device. When appraisal statutes were originally drafted the ‘cash-out’ 
merger had not been anticipated; however, today (in the USA) ‘cash-out’ mergers are 
commonly used. When a shareholder dissents from such a merger he does not 
decline to continue in the company, but is eliminated from continued participation 
therein; thus the estoppel rationale cannot operate to prevent him claiming the 
synergy gains from the merger.224 In this context the shareholder only dissents from 
being ‘cashed-out’ at the amount specified by the company; thus the estoppel 
rationale for, and the exclusion of, synergy gains is most out of place in ‘cash-out’ 
mergers, as it facilitates the use of the appraisal statute to oppress minority 
shareholders225 and results in an ‘undeserved windfall’ for the majority.226   
 
Professor Siegel submits that the synergy gains from a fundamental 
transaction should not be taken into account when determining fair value, as taking 
these gains into account allows the dissenting shareholder to ‘have it both ways’ i.e. 
to exit the company and simultaneously share in the future expected gains.227 
Professor Siegel further submits that in spite of the fact that shareholders are forced-
out of their investments, they bear neither the costs nor the risks of the future 
company; thus they should not be entitled to share in its rewards.228  
 
With respect, Professor Siegel’s argument is non sequitur as it runs counter to 
the appraisal remedy’s modern purpose of protecting minority shareholders from 
abuse by the majority. The fact that the ‘cashed-out’ shareholders bear neither the 
costs nor the risks of the post merger company is irrelevant; the fact is that their 
                                                
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Thompson op cit note 50 at 259. 
226 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Part 7, Chapter 4 (1994) 
§7.22 comment at 327. 
227 Siegel op cit note 184 at 139-40. 
228 Ibid at 140. 
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shareholding was terminated whilst they were content with their investment as it 
stood or even as it would have stood after implementation of the fundamental 
transaction. The exclusion of synergy gains was justified by the shareholder’s dissent 
from the proposed transaction from which synergy gains were expected to be derived 
(estoppel justification); however, this dissent may not always be genuine: the 
shareholders may wish to remain in the company, and may even support the 
proposed transaction, but due to the fact that the fundamental transaction is 
structured as a ‘cash-out’ merger they are forced out of the company and, if they are 
unhappy with the amount of consideration offered for their shares, the perfection 
procedure requires that the shareholders dissent from the proposed transaction.229 
Thus, taking account of synergy gains, in the context of cash-out mergers, does not 
allow dissenting shareholders to ‘have it both ways’ since there are no two ways 
about it: the shareholders have no choice but to exit the company. 
 
It is accordingly submitted that whether the synergy gains of a fundamental 
transaction should be taken into account, in the determination of fair value, should 
depend on whether the shareholder voluntarily ‘opted-out’ or was ‘forced-out’ of the 
company. In the former case the merger resolution’s adoption should have no effect 
on the determination, as the shareholder does not wish to retain his investment; 
however, in the latter instance the effect of the resolution’s adoption should be taken 
into account since the shareholder would have retained his/her investment had he/she 
not been forced-out. 
 
(c) The role of the market 
 
In the USA one of the most contentions issues, in relation to judicial determination 
of fair value, is the role that the market price of the shares should play in valuation. 
Nowhere is the contention more apparent than in regard to the ‘market-out 
exception’. A ‘market-out exception’ denies the appraisal remedy to dissenting 
shareholders of listed companies and obligates them to sell their shares for the 
market price on the occurrence of a triggering event.  
 
                                                
229 Section 164(5)(c)(i). 
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Although the South African appraisal remedy does not contain a ‘market-out 
exception’, the conceptual basis underlying it is worth noting as it gives an indication 
of the potential role that the market price might play in judicial determination of fair 
value. There are two conceptual bases underlying the ‘market-out exception’. First, it 
was felt that the market adequately valued shares, which accordingly made the 
appraisal remedy redundant for publicly traded shares.230 Secondly, under the 
original liquidity rationale it would be superfluous to have an appraisal remedy that 
provides liquidity when it already exists in the market place; however, the appraisal 
remedy is no longer primarily motivated by the liquidity purpose.231 It is presumed 
that in states where the appraisal remedy has been enacted without a ‘market-out 
exception’ the legislatures intended that the courts should not rely exclusively on the 
market price to determine fair value, since the market does not always adequately 
protect minority shareholders.232  
 
Corporate controllers can easily depress the market price of the shares of their 
corporation in order to ‘cash-out’ minority shareholders at a low price and, 
thereafter, appropriate the corporate value for themselves.233 Since the markets are 
forever in a state of flux the corporate controllers can manipulate the timing of the 
fundamental transaction, to their advantage and the detriment of the minority 
shareholders, by ensuring that the time when the shares’ fair value is to be 
determined (immediately before: resolution adoption in South Africa and transaction 
effectuation in the USA) coincides with a dip in the corporation’s share prices.234 
Moreover, they may manipulate the corporation’s actions in order to artificially 
depress the market price of the shares at the time when the shares are to valued. 
 
Another argument against the reliance on the market price to determine fair 
value arises from informational asymmetry.235 Those in control of the corporation 
have access to information that minority shareholders do not and which is not 
                                                
230 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 633. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid at 635. Moreover, minority shareholders who are cashed-out require additional protection 
where the merger consideration is at a premium to the market price of the shares, since deference to 
the market price, in such instances, shall render the appraisal remedy worthless as the primary 
minority shareholder protection remedy.  
233 Ibid at 638. 
234 Ibid at 636. 
235 Ibid at 638. 
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reflected in the market value of the shares.236 The controllers may use such 
information to their advantage and unfairly relegate the dissenting shareholders to a 
market price that does not reflect the value of that information.237 
 
It is submitted that the exclusion of a ‘market-out exception’, from the South 
African appraisal remedy, is an emphatic rejection by the legislature of the market 
price as an appropriate or trustworthy indicia of fair value – due to the market’s 
susceptibility to manipulation by corporate managers. However, since minimal 
guidance as to the determination of fair value is given this does not mean that the 
market price should be completely excluded from the determination of fair value; it 
should just not be the sole determinant thereof. Furthermore, wholesale exclusion of 
the market price as a determinant is ‘too crude of a choice’: although the market may 
not always achieve the optimum price neither do the variables involved in other 
valuation methodology, which generally occasion much larger financial and time 
costs.238  
 
(d) What is to be valued? 
 
A fundamental issue in judicial appraisal is whether the court should attempt to value 
the particular minority interest held by the dissenting shareholder or, rather, attempt 
to value the corporation as a whole.239 The former approach permits minority 
discounts whilst the latter approach does not. A minority discount is used, once the 
value of the corporation as a whole has been ascertained, to arrive at the value of the 
particular dissenting shareholder’s shareholding.240 The Delaware courts have 
emphatically opted to value the corporation as a whole and then award a pro rata 
portion of that value to the dissenting shareholders instead of utilising minority 
discounts.241 The preference for this approach is predicated upon the purpose of the 
appraisal remedy: the protection of minority shareholders from majority 
                                                
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Siegel op cit note 178 at 247. 
239 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 641. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
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oppression.242 The fulfilment of this purpose requires the dissenter to receive pro 
rata share of the corporation since 
 
‘“fail[ure] to accord to a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his 
shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority 
shareholders who may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a 
dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesirable result.”’243  
 
The minority discount essentially encourages majority shareholders to take 
advantage of the minority, as it allows the former to appropriate a portion of the 
value of the company from the latter.244 The problem is compounded when the value 
of the corporation is determined with regard to the market price, since it already 
reflects the minority discount.245 If a minority discount is imposed after a market 
price valuation the shares are effectively discounted twice to reflect their minority 
status; thus the majority appropriate the discounted value.246 This defeats the 
minority shareholder rationale underlying the appraisal remedy. 
 
The complexity created by the judicial determination of fair value shall 
impact the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy as the primary form of minority 
shareholder protection in fundamental transactions, since the determination of fair 
value is the most critical element to the success of the remedy. Accordingly, if the 
remedy is perceived to be inequitable or unpredictable by minority shareholders it 
shall become completely redundant and, therefore, ineffective as the primary form of 
shareholder protection: shareholder will opt for other remedies, which may be more 
inefficient and time consuming for the shareholders and the company, or they may 
just accept the terms of the merger agreement in spite of their unhappiness therewith. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
242 Ibid at 643. 
243 Cavalier Oil Corp. v Hamett, 564 A.2d 1137,1145 (Del. 1989). 
244 Wertheimer op cit note 166 at 644-5. 
245 Ibid at 645. 
246 Ibid. 
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VII   AVOIDANCE OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS 
 
The appraisal remedy can be ‘a frightful nuisance, drain and burden’ upon 
companies and their resources:247 appraisal pay-outs and appraisal litigation costs 
may drain the company of valued liquidity at a time when it is most needed; the 
appraisal remedy may spoil corporate controllers’ plans to eliminate minority 
shareholders on terms favourable to the company; the appraisal procedure may 
uncover wrongdoing by corporate controllers; and appraisal may be an 
administrative nuisance for the company. Consequently US companies, undergoing 
triggering transactions, often pay corporate lawyers vast sums of money to find legal 
loopholes that avoid triggering the appraisal remedy. There are two common 
methods of avoidance: (1) the ‘kick-out’ provision contained in the merger 
agreement of merging companies; and (2) the triangular merger structure. If these 
methods of avoidance are efficacious the appraisal remedy shall be completely 
ineffective as a form of minority shareholder protection: the remedy is not triggered; 
thus the shareholders are denied access to it. This section analyses the two main 
methods of appraisal avoidance and, thereafter, looks at the various options available 
to minority shareholders to overcome these methods of avoidance.  
 
(a) ‘Kick-out’ provisions 
 
In the USA it is common to find ‘kick-out’ provisions contained in merger 
agreements between/among merging companies. ‘Kick-out’ provisions permit the 
boards of one or all of the merging companies to call off the merger if it becomes 
apparent that an ‘intolerable amount’ of cash may have to be paid to dissenting 
shareholders in the form of appraisal pay-outs.248 The ‘kick-out’ provision does not 
prevent the triggering or operation of the minority shareholders’ appraisal rights in a 
fundamental transaction, but rather makes the entire fundamental transaction 
conditional upon the number of appraisal claims made. If the ‘kick-out’ provision’s 
threshold is met, the dissenting shareholders are not able to claim appraisal since the 
merger agreement and the appraisal triggering transaction are null and void; 
however, if the provision’s threshold is not met, the fundamental transaction goes 
                                                
247 Manning op cit note 27 at 234. 
248 Ibid at 237. 
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ahead and the dissenting shareholders have access to the appraisal remedy. 
Accordingly, a ‘kick-out’ provision is not technically a method of appraisal 
avoidance. Quite the contrary, it actually gives effect to one of the main purposes of 
the appraisal remedy: to operate as a restraint on bad business judgements by the 
board of directors since it forces the board to reconsider its decision on the basis of 
the number of shareholders that claim appraisal. 
 
(b) The triangular merger structure as a method of avoidance 
 
A common method of appraisal avoidance is through the utilisation of the triangular 
merger structure. Unlike a traditional pooling merger (see page 15 above) in a 
triangular merger there are three companies involved. On the target side of the 
transaction there is the target company (‘T Co’), while on the acquiring side there are 
two companies: the holding company (‘H Co’) and its wholly owned subsidiary 
company (‘S Co’). The H Co is the acquiring party in substance, but the S Co is the 
acquiring party in form. The S Co is a shell company – holding no assets or liabilities 
of its own – that is specifically formed for the purposes of the merger: it functions as 
an acquisition vehicle in the merger with T Co. The merger is structured in such a 
way that the T Co merges into the S Co and henceforth becomes a subsidiary of the 
H Co. In substance the merger is between the H Co and T Co; however, due to the 
triangular merger structure and the companies’ separate legal personalities the 
merger is technically (or formally) between the subsidiary of the H Co and the T 
Co.249 Consequently the shareholders of the H Co are not entitled to vote on S Co’s 
special resolution to merge – making approval thereof uncontentious since H Co is 
the sole shareholder – nor exercise their appraisal rights in respect of the transaction. 
Through the triangular merger structure the H Co avoids all the inconveniences 
associated with the appraisal right by ensuring the triggering transaction does not 
technically (or legally) trigger the shareholders’ appraisal rights. 
 
                                                
249 In R v Milne and Erleigh (7) 1951 (1) 791 (A) at 827-8 and Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v 
Econovaal Ltd 1985(4) SA 615 (T) 625 it was held that each company in a group of companies is a 
separate legal entity possessing its own separate legal personality, rights, duties, privileges and 
liabilities separate from other companies in the group. In Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd 1988 
(3) SA 290 (A) it was held that the acts of a subsidiary company are not necessarily the acts of its 
holding company, and vice versa, since a subsidiary company is a separate legal entity from its 
holding company. 
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In substance the merger is between the H Co and the T Co for the following 
reasons.250 First, the S Co is formed solely for the purpose of acquiring the T Co; 
secondly, the merger is effectively financed by the H Co; and thirdly, a triangular 
merger has a direct impact upon the shareholders of the H Co: if the merger 
consideration payable to the shareholders of the T Co is in the form of shares in the 
H Co this results in a dilution of the shares thereof; and if the merger consideration is 
cash, emanating from the H Co, it may impact on the dividends payable to the 
shareholders of the H Co.251 Thus the triangular merger, when utilised as a method of 
appraisal avoidance, results in the disenfranchisement of the H Co’s shareholders; 
however, some of the Act’s remedies may be utilised by these shareholders to 
overcome the avoidance of their appraisal rights. These remedies and their 
effectiveness are considered below. 
 
(i) Clause 119(2)(b) of the Companies Bill 
 
Clause 119(2)(b) of the draft Companies Bill252 provided that a merger must be 
approved by shareholders of a subsidiary’s H Co, if any, if the transaction by the S 
Co substantially constituted a ‘parallel transaction’ by the H Co.253 The term ‘parallel 
transaction’ was not defined, but it contemplated a triangular merger by which the 
transaction entered into by the S Co amounted to a ‘simultaneous, corresponding or 
“parallel” transaction’ by the H Co: a merger that was formally between the S Co and 
T Co, but substantively between the H Co and the T Co, which therefore constituted 
a substantially ‘parallel transaction by the H Co’.254 If this interpretation of ‘parallel 
transaction’ were correct it would have meant that the shareholders of an H Co 
engaged in a triangular merger would have retained their right to vote on the merger 
resolution and to their appraisal remedy. Accordingly, the triangular merger structure 
would not have been able to be utilised as a method of appraisal avoidance. 
However, this clause never made it to enactment and does not form part of the 
Act.255 A similar protective provision is contained in s 115(2)(b), but this is only 
applicable to the disposal of the greater part of the assets or undertakings of a 
                                                
250 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 706; M F Cassim op cit note 1 at 30. 
251 Ibid at 31-2. 
252Companies Bill supra note 49. 
253 M F Cassim op cit note 1 at 31. 
254 Ibid. 
255 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 706. 
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company in terms of s 112. The exclusion of this protective measure creates the 
potential for unfairness to the shareholders of the H Co in triangular mergers as they 
are denied their primary protective measure: the appraisal remedy.256  
 
Could the legislature have intended to permit the avoidance of appraisal 
rights through triangular mergers? One could argue that the alteration of the draft 
Companies Bill and the restricted applicability of s 115(2)(b) to the disposal of 
assets, in terms of s 112, may indicate such legislative intent; however, such an 
interpretation is completely contrary to the need to balance majority and minority 
shareholders’ rights, and provide sufficient minority shareholder protection, in light 
of the policy liberalisation introduced through the introduction of M&As. It is more 
likely that the legislature did not foresee the potentially unfair consequences that 
might arise as a result of triangular mergers.   
 
(ii) Section 41(3) 
 
M F Cassim submits that s 41(3) could provide a ‘safety-net’ for the shareholders of 
the H Co: it requires a special resolution by shareholders for the issue of shares in a 
transaction where the voting power of that class of shares comprises 30 per cent or 
more of the voting power of all the shares in that class held by shareholders 
immediately before the transaction.257 Effectively, when the H Co issues shares to its 
subsidiary to be used as merger consideration in the merger with the T Co, s 41(3) 
gives the shareholders of the H Co a right to approve that issuance of shares; 
therefore it does not trigger the dissenting shareholders’ appraisal remedy. Moreover, 
if the merger consideration takes the form of cash, and not the issuance of shares in 
the H Co, the shareholders thereof shall not be entitled to approve the issue of that 
cash to the S Co, unless the issue thereof constitutes an ‘integrated transaction’ as 
contemplated in s 41(3); nevertheless the appraisal remedy will still not be triggered. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that, s 41(3) provides minimal assistance to the 
shareholders of an H Co involved in a triangular merger as it does not trigger their 
appraisal remedy.  
 
                                                
256 Ibid. 
257 M F Cassim op cit note 1 at 32. 
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(iii) Section 6(1): the anti-avoidance provision 
 
Since the merger is substantively between the H Co and the T Co, and only 
technically between the S Co and the T Co, the anti-avoidance provision, contained 
in s 6(1), may be of some assistance to the disenfranchised shareholders.258 Anti-
avoidance provisions are new and unusual in the field of company law and are 
generally found in fiscal legislation.259 Anti-avoidance provisions aim to ensure that 
an ‘avoiding party’ cannot use the technicalities of a transaction to prevent the 
occurrence of the normal and natural legal consequences of the substantive 
transaction in which it is involved – i.e. it aims to ensure that the ‘avoiding party’ is 
not left in a position as if the legal consequences of the technical transaction were the 
normal and natural legal consequences of the substantive transaction.260 261   
                                                
258 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 706. 
259 Farouk H I Cassim ‘Introduction to the New Companies Act: General Overview of the Act’ in 
Farouk H I Cassim (managing ed) et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 1 at 7. 
260 My understanding and adaptation of Schreiner JA’s judgment, explaining the aim of the anti-
avoidance provision in the field of tax law, in the fiscal case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A) at 216: 
‘I do not read [the anti-avoidance provision] as a penalty section or as widening the net 
beyond the general scope of the Act. It seems to aim at a truer or fairer determination of the 
liability to the taxes imposed by the Act and their due payment when so determined. It is 
intended…to deal with cases in which the Commissioner…is properly aggrieved by a 
transaction or operation designed to enable one of the parties thereto to escape tax. The 
Commissioner is not properly aggrieved merely because at a stage before income has accrued 
to a taxpayer it might have been predicted with confidence, amounting even to certainty, that 
if the taxpayer took no steps in the matter such income would accrue to him, and because he 
then takes the avoiding steps. But the Commissioner would be properly aggrieved if a 
transaction or operation were entered into which prevented income from accruing to the 
taxpayer while leaving him in the position of one to whom the income would normally and 
naturally accrue. The section…is designed to meet the Commissioner’s objections to the 
creation of abnormal or unnatural situations, to the detriment of the fiscus.’ [My emphasis]  
261 Although the anti-avoidance provision seems to vest in the courts a power similar to the court’s 
inherent power to give effect to the substance of a transaction rather than its form, it must not be 
confused therewith. The court’s substance over form power is utilised for disguised, simulated or 
sham transactions. In Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd 1941 
AD 369, at 395-96, De Wet CJ defined what a ‘disguised transactions’ is: 
‘In essence it is a dishonest transaction: dishonest, in as much as the parties to it do not really 
intend it to have, inter partes, the legal effect which its terms convey to the outside world. 
The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by concealing what is the real agreement or 
transaction between the parties. The parties wish to hide the fact that their real agreement or 
transaction falls within the prohibition or is subject to the tax, and so they dress it up in a 
guise which conveys the impression that it is outside of the prohibition or not subject to the 
tax. Such a transaction is said to be in fraudem legis, and is interpreted by the courts in 
accordance with what is found to be the real agreement or transaction between the parties.’  
A triangular merger transaction  
‘is not necessarily a disguised [transaction] because it is devised for the purpose of evading 
[a] prohibition [or requirement] in the Act… . A transaction devised for that purpose, if the 
parties honestly intend it to have effect according to its tenor, is interpreted by the courts 
according to its tenor, and then the only question is whether, so interpreted, it falls within or 
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Section 6(1) provides: 
 
‘A court, on application by the Commission, Panel or an exchange in respect of a 
company listed on that exchange, may declare any agreement, transaction, 
arrangement, resolution or provision of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
or rules –  
(a)   to be primarily or substantially intended to defeat or reduce the effect of 
a prohibition or requirement established by or in terms of an unalterable 
provision of this Act; and 
(b)   void to the extent that it defeats or reduces the effect of a prohibition or 
requirement established by or in terms of an unalterable provision of this 
Act.’ 
 
Prior to delving into whether the substantive requirements of s 6(1) are met, it 
is imperative to note that shareholders of the H Co do not have locus standi to make 
an application to the court in terms of s 6(1) – only the regulatory agencies do. Either 
the Companies Commission (‘Commission’), Takeover Regulations Panel (‘Panel’), 
or, if the company is listed, the exchange upon which it is listed may make the 
application. Accordingly, a disenfranchised shareholder will have to either: petition 
the pertinent exchange to make the application, if the company he is a shareholder in 
is listed; or initiate a complaint to the Commission or Panel, whichever has 
jurisdiction, in terms of s 168 alleging that his right to the appraisal remedy has been 
infringed.262 After an investigation in terms of s 169 the Commission or Panel has 
the choice to decide whether to make an anti-avoidance application to court in terms 
of s 6(1) or not.263 
                                                                                                                                     
without the prohibition [or complies with the requirement]… .’ (Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 369 at 395.) 
Accordingly, simply because the triangular merger is devised for purposes of avoiding the appraisal 
rights of dissenting shareholders does not mean it is a disguised transaction. Provided the ‘avoiding 
party’ honestly intends the triangular merger to avoid the triggering of the appraisal remedy, it shall 
be interpreted in accordance therewith, and the only question that remains is whether the triangular 
merger transaction falls within the purview of the s 6(1) anti-avoidance provision. 
262 Section 168(1). 
263 It is important to note that s 170(1), which provides for the appropriate course of action to be taken 
by the Commission or Panel after the completion of an investigation into a complaint, does not make 
express provision for applications in terms of other provisions of the Act (e.g. in terms of s 6(1)); 
however, s 170(1) states that ‘[a]fter receiving the report of an inspector or independent investigator, 
the Commission or Panel…may…’ take any number of a listed course of actions. The use of the word 
‘may’ indicates that s 170(1) is permissive and does not contain a numerus clausus of actions; 
accordingly the choice remains with the Commission or Panel to decide what course of action it shall 
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If the three requirements set out in s 6(1) are satisfied a court shall have the 
discretion to declare the triangular merger void as a method of appraisal 
avoidance.264 First, the avoidance must relate to an ‘agreement, transaction, 
arrangement, resolution or provision of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
or rules’. The first requirement is definitely fulfilled since a triangular merger is a 
fundamental transaction,265 regulated by a merger agreement266 between the S Co 
and the T Co, which is approved by a special resolution267 of the shareholders of 
both companies. Furthermore, amongst all three companies involved, a triangular 
merger may constitute an arrangement.  
 
Secondly, the triangular merger must ‘be primarily or substantially intended 
to defeat or reduce the effect of a prohibition or requirement established by or in 
terms of an unalterable provision of this Act’.268 It is submitted that s 115(8) of the 
Act establishes a requirement that dissenting shareholders must be able to access the 
appraisal remedy if their company is involved in a triggering transaction. Section 
115(8) provides:  
 
‘The holder of any voting rights in a company is entitled to seek relief in terms of 
section 164 if that person –  
(a)   notified the company in advance of the intention to oppose a special 
resolution contemplated in this section; and 
    (b)   was present at the meeting and voted against that special resolution.’ 
[My emphasis.] 
 
Section 115(8) may be termed a conditional requirement since dissenting 
shareholders are only ‘entitled’ to their appraisal rights if they comply with 
subsections (a) & (b); however, it is impossible for shareholders of an H Co, engaged 
in a triangular merger, to comply with these requirement since the technicalities of 
the triangular merger disenfranchise them of their right to vote on the special 
resolution; consequently a requirement in terms of the Act cannot be established. 
                                                                                                                                     
pursue after the conclusion of the investigation – depending on the outcome of the investigation s 6(1) 
may be appropriate.   
264 Section 6(1)(b). 
265 Section 115(1). 
266 Section 113(2). 
267 Section 115(2). 
268 Section 6(1)(a). 
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This leads to a circular situation; notwithstanding, if one has regard to the aim of an 
anti-avoidance provision it becomes clear that this is exactly the situation for which 
an anti-avoidance provision is designed. Anti-avoidance provisions aim to ensure 
that an ‘avoiding party’ (H Co) cannot use the technicalities of a transaction 
(triangular merger) to prevent the occurrence of the normal and natural legal 
consequences (the triggering of shareholders’ right to vote and to the appraisal 
remedy) of the substantive transaction (the merger between the H Co and the T Co) it 
is involved in.269 Accordingly, when determining whether the prerequisites of s 
115(8) have been satisfied it must be assumed that the normal and natural legal 
consequences of the substantive merger took place and, consequently, that dissenting 
shareholders would have had the opportunity to comply with the prerequisites and 
did comply therewith. Upon this assumption a dissenting shareholder would, in terms 
of s 115(8), be ‘entitled’ to pursue his appraisal right and, if the shareholder decided 
to pursue this entitlement, a requirement would be established: the dissenting 
shareholder, and ergo the company, must observe and follow the procedure laid 
down ‘in terms of s 164’.  
 
The requirement is established ‘in terms of an unalterable provision’ of the 
Act. An ‘unalterable provision’ is defined as  
 
‘a provision of this Act that does not expressly contemplate that its effect on any 
particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended or 
otherwise altered in substance or effect by a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation or rules.’270 
 
After a careful perusal of ss 115 & 164 it is evident that they do ‘not 
expressly contemplate that [their] effects on any particular company’, except a 
company undergoing business rescue,271 ‘may be negated, restricted, limited, 
qualified or otherwise altered in substance or in effect by a company’s Memorandum 
                                                
269 i.e. it aims to ensure that the ‘avoiding party’ (H Co) is not left in a position as if the legal 
consequences of the technical transaction (triangular merger) were the normal and natural legal 
consequences of the substantive transaction (the merger between the H Co and the T Co). 
270 Section 1 ‘unalterable provision’. 
271 Section 164(1). 
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of Incorporation or rules’. Accordingly, ss 115(8) & 164 are ‘unalterable 
provision[s]’ as defined.  
 
Thirdly, the triangular merger must ‘be primarily or substantially intended to 
defeat or reduce the effect of a…requirement established…in terms of an unalterable 
provision’ of the Act.272 Accordingly it must be demonstrated that the board, acting 
on behalf of the H Co, utilised the triangular merger structure primarily or 
substantially to defeat the triggering of their dissenting shareholders’ appraisal right. 
Whether this requirement is met shall depend on the facts of the transaction. In this 
regard it is important to note that there are various advantages related to the 
triangular merger structure, besides defeating the triggering of dissenting 
shareholders’ appraisal rights, which make it an attractive merger structure. The first 
advantage is that the structure enables the H Co to acquire and conduct the business 
of the T Co as a wholly owned subsidiary (i.e. separate legal entity), which allows 
the H Co to protect itself from the liabilities – including contingent liabilities not 
discovered in the due diligence enquiry – of the T Co.273 A second advantage is that 
unlike the traditional pooling merger neither the H Co nor the T Co (nor their 
respective businesses) need to disappear; consequently the T Co’s goodwill, 
customer relationships, business and workforce may be maintained considerably 
intact and unaltered in the H Co’s subsidiary.274 A third advantage is that the rights 
of third party contractors and creditors of the T Co are less likely to be prejudiced by 
the merger since the assets and liabilities of the T Co shall remain intact, as the S Co 
is a shell company with no assets or liabilities of its own.275  
 
Provided the primary or substantial intention of the H Co is to defeat the 
triggering of their shareholders’ appraisal right, and not the attainment of any of the 
above advantages, the third requirement shall be satisfied. It is important, once again, 
to emphasise that this shall entail a factual enquiry, which is dependent upon the 
evidence brought before the court.276 It is opined that if an H Co engages in a 
triangular merger primarily for the purposes of attaining the above advantages, it will 
                                                
272 Section 6(1)(a). 
273 M F Cassim op cit note 69 at 705. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid. 
276 The Commission or Panel will most likely have a surplus of evidence from its investigation in 
terms of Parts D and E of Chapter 7 of the Act. 
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most likely allow its shareholders to vote on the merger resolution and to access their 
appraisal rights; if it does not, it shall be a good indication that triangular merger is 
primarily intended to defeat the triggering of their shareholders’ appraisal rights.  
 
If the three requirements of s 6(1) are fulfilled the court has the discretionary 
power to declare the triangular merger ‘void to the extent that it defeats…’ the 
triggering of the disenfranchised shareholders’ appraisal rights.277  
 
It is submitted that the anti-avoidance provision contained in s 6(1) shall be 
an effective way for disenfranchised shareholders, of an H Co, to overcome 
avoidance of their appraisal rights through the triangular merger structure. Section 
6(1) shall be attractive to disenfranchised shareholders because only the 
Commission, Panel or relevant exchange has locus standi to make the anti-avoidance 
application; therefore a proper and full investigation into the matter shall take place 
and neither the costs of the investigation nor the court application shall be borne by 
the disenfranchised shareholders. Furthermore, if the Commission or Panel does 
decide to make an anti-avoidance application it will probably be successful because 
the decision to make the application will be predicated upon the evidence produced 
from a full and thorough investigation into the matter.278 
 
(iv) Piercing the corporate veil 
 
A further option available to disenfranchised shareholders, to overcome the 
avoidance of their appraisal rights, is the veil piercing remedy. Company law is 
predicated upon the separate legal existence of companies from their controllers and 
owners. From the time that a company is incorporated, in accordance with the 
pertinent legislation, it acquires its own legal personality;279 therefore companies are 
imbued with separate legal personality only by virtue of statute and, accordingly, 
‘their separate existence remains a figment of law, liable to be curtailed or withdrawn 
when the objects of their creation are abused or thwarted.’280 One such method of 
curtailment or withdrawal of a company’s legal personality is veil piercing. When 
                                                
277 Section 6(1)(b). 
278 In terms of Parts D and E of Chapter 7 of the Act. 
279 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
280 Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd [2009] 1 All SA 330 (SCA) para 15. 
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the corporate veil of a company is pierced the separate legal personality of the 
company, along with the protection afforded thereby to the directors and 
shareholders thereof, is revoked, and the substance of the company is analysed rather 
than its form.281  
 
Although veil piercing has long been a part of South African common law the 
Act, for the first time in our company law, introduced a statutory veil piercing 
procedure, which gives courts the general authority to pierce the corporate veil.282 
The statutory procedure is contained in s 20(9) of the Act. It does not override the 
veil piercing remedy at common law; thus where the requirements of the former are 
not fulfilled one may rely on latter.283  The principles developed at common law may 
also serve as useful guidelines in the interpretation of s 20(9) and in deciding 
whether the corporate veil should be pierced or not.284 The effectiveness of s 20(9) in 
overcoming appraisal avoidance through the use of the triangular merger structure is 
analysed below. 
 
In order to provide context to the analysis of s 20(9) it is important to briefly 
look at some general principles of piercing the corporate veil at common law. The 
leading case on our courts’ approach to piercing the corporate veil is Cape Pacific 
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd285 where the AD set out the 
following general principles: (1) courts should not lightly disregard a company’s 
legal personality, since this is the cardinal reason for its existence;286 (2) courts do 
not have a general discretion to disregard a company’s separate legal personality;287 
(3) each case must be decided on its own facts;288 (4) conflicting policy 
considerations are to be balanced against each other when deciding whether to pierce 
the corporate veil i.e. the need to preserve the company’s legal personality must be 
weighed against principles in favour of piercing the corporate veil;289 (5) separate 
                                                
281 Rehana Cassim ‘The Legal Concept of a Company’ in Farouk H I Cassim (managing ed) et al 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 28 at 41. 
282 Ibid at 57. 
283 Ibid at 58. 
284 Ibid. 
285 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
286 Ibid at 803. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid at 803-4. 
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legal personality may be disregarded in relation to the transaction in question whilst 
giving full effect to it in other respects;290 and (6) the existence of an alternative 
remedy does not bar the court from piercing the veil.291 In the case of Hülse-Reutter 
v Gödde292 the SCA seems to have overturned principle (6) as it stated that veil 
piercing should only be used as a matter of last resort;293 thus, at common law, the 
corporate veil shall only be pierced in exceptional circumstances since separate legal 
personality is the very quintessence of a company’s reason for existence.294 
 
Section 20(9) of the Act provides: 
 
‘If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company 
is involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the 
company, or any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable 
abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may – 
(a)   declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in 
respect of any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a 
shareholder of the company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a 
member of the company, or of another person specified in the declaration; 
and 
(b)   make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to 
a declaration contemplated in paragraph (a).’ 
 
It is debatable whether s 20(9) should be used as a remedy of last resort – as 
the common law remedy is.295 It also seems that courts have a wider discretion to 
pierce the veil under the statutory remedy than the common law remedy.296 It is 
opined that consideration must be given to the fact that veil piercing is an exceptional 
remedy, which should be used sparingly:297 just because the remedy is contained in 
statutory form does not change the fact that the separate legal personality of a 
company remains the primary reason for its existence. The avoidance of 
                                                
290 Ibid at 804. 
291 Ibid at 805. 
292 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
293 Ibid para 23. 
294 R Cassim op cit note 281 at 50. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid. 
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shareholders’ appraisal rights, through the utilisation of the triangular merger 
structure, constitutes a prima facie exceptional circumstance.  
 
A disenfranchised shareholder pursuing s 20(9) must satisfy its three 
requirements in order to successfully overcome appraisal avoidance. First, only an 
‘interested person’ has locus standi to make an application to court in terms of s 
20(9); however, ‘interested person’ is not defined in the Act. If one looks for 
interpretive guidance in the equivalent provision of the Close Corporations Act298 
(‘CC Act’) the courts have held that it must not be interpreted too restrictively, nor 
must it be interpreted too widely so as to include indirect interests.299 The court 
further stated that the interest is limited to a mere financial or monetary interest.300 A 
triangular merger has a direct financial effect on the shareholders of the H Co: if the 
merger consideration to be allocated to the shareholders of the T Co takes the form 
of shares in the H Co it dilutes the shares thereof; and if the merger consideration is 
in the form of cash, emanating from the H Co, it may impact on the dividends 
payable to the shareholders of the H Co.301 Accordingly, on the basis of the above 
interpretation, a disenfranchised shareholder would constitute an ‘interested person’ 
in terms of s 20(9) and, accordingly, have locus standi to make an application in 
terms thereof. 
 
It is important to note that a disenfranchised shareholder may wish to initiate 
a complaint with the Commission or Panel in terms of s 168 in the hope that, after 
the Commission’s or Tribunal’s investigation is complete, it will pursue the s 20(9) 
remedy in the name of the shareholder (complainant) in terms of s 170(1)(e).302 If the 
shareholder’s hopes come true it would mean that a full and thorough investigation 
into the matter would be conducted, which would produce vital evidence for the veil 
piercing proceedings, and that the costs of the proceeding would be borne by the 
Commission or Panel. These are substantial advantages for minority shareholders 
                                                
298 Section 65 of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984. 
299 TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO 1998 (1) SA 971 (O) at 986. 
300 Ibid. 
301 M F Cassim op cit note 1 at 31-2. 
302 ‘After receiving the report of an inspector or independent investigator, the Commission or Panel, as 
the case may be, may –  
(e) commence proceedings in a court in the name of the complainant, if the complainant- 
       (i) has a right in terms of this Act to apply to a court in respect of that matter; and 
      (ii) has consented to the Commission or Panel, as the case may be, doing so…’ 
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since they generally do not have the capacity to conduct an investigation nor the 
money to fund the court proceedings.  
 
Secondly, the unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the 
company, as a separate entity, must occur either: on the incorporation of the 
company; due to the use of the company; or by any act on behalf of or by the 
company. When the controllers of the H Co utilise the triangular merger structure, 
for appraisal avoidance, an S Co is incorporated and used as an acquisition vehicle 
to merge with the T Co. Accordingly, the second requirement is certainly met, as 
there is both incorporation and use of a company (S Co).  
 
Thirdly, the incorporation or use must constitute ‘an unconscionable abuse of 
the juristic personality of the [subsidiary] company as a separate entity…’.  The term 
‘unconscionable abuse’ is not defined in the Act nor does s 20(9) give any guidance 
as to the facts or circumstances that would constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’ of 
juristic personality.303 It is trite law that legislative language should be read in its 
‘ordinary sense’.304 In order to determine the ‘ordinary sense’ or meaning of 
legislative language a dictionary may be used as an aid.305 ‘Unconscionable’ is 
defined as ‘irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable’306 and ‘unscrupulous or 
unprincipled’.307 ‘Abuse’ is defined as ‘[a]n improper usage, corrupt practice’308 and 
‘to use incorrectly or improperly; misuse’.309 Accordingly, in its ‘ordinary sense’, an 
‘unconscionable abuse’ requires an unscrupulous or unprincipled misuse of ‘the 
juristic personality of the [subsidiary] company as a separate entity…’.  
 
If regard is had to the rationale for the introduction of the appraisal remedy it 
becomes patent that the utilisation of the triangular merger structure, to avoid 
dissenting shareholders’ appraisal rights, is an unscrupulous misuse or 
‘unconscionable abuse’ of the separate legal personality of the S Co. The appraisal 
                                                
303 R Cassim op cit note 281 at 60. 
304 Union Government (Minister of Finance) v Mack 1917 AD 731 at 739. 
305 Case v Minister of Safety & Security, Curtis v Minister of Safety & Security 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) 
para 58. 
306 William Little, H W Fowler & J Coulson ‘The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ 3 ed (1970) at 
2288. 
307 Morven Dooner, Elaine Higgleton & Lorna Knight ‘Collins Dictionary’ 9 ed (2007) at 1748. 
308 Oxford Dictionary op cit note 306 at 9. 
309 Collins Dictionary op cit note 307 at 7. 
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remedy was introduced to counterbalance the policy liberalisation that accompanied 
the introduction of the court-free M&As device.310 The wide range of permissible 
merger consideration and structures, as well as the fact that M&As are court-free 
procedures, means minority shareholders are more susceptible to oppression and 
abuse by corporate controllers; hence the need for the appraisal remedy to function 
as the primary protective measure for minority shareholders in M&As. The need for 
minority shareholder protection is emphasised by the fact that the appraisal remedy is 
only available in the event of certain fundamental transactions, which indicates that 
such transactions have considerable and far-reaching effects upon shareholders.311 
The effects of the triangular merger are no different upon the shareholders of the H 
Co: if the merger consideration, payable to the shareholders of the T Co, is in the 
form of shares in the H Co it results in a dilution of the shares thereof; and if the 
merger consideration is cash, stemming from the H Co, it may impact on the 
dividends payable to the shareholders of the H Co.312 Since the triangular merger 
structure leads to a situation where the merger is substantively between H Co and T 
Co,313 and technically between S Co and T Co, the shareholders of the H Co suffer 
abuse and oppression without access to their primary protective remedy: the 
appraisal remedy. Accordingly, the incorporation and use of a S Co, in terms of the 
triangular merger structure, to avoid the primary protective remedy of dissenting 
shareholders in fundamental transactions (the appraisal remedy) ‘constitutes an 
unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the [subsidiary] company as a 
separate entity…’. 
 
Provided the above three requirements are satisfied the court has the 
discretionary power to: (1) revoke the juristic personality of the S Co ‘in respect of 
any right, obligation or liability of the [subsidiary] company or of a shareholder of 
the [subsidiary] company [i.e. the H Co]…’ created in terms of the merger 
agreement;314 and (2) ‘make any further order the court considers appropriate to give 
effect to…’ the above revocation of juristic personality.315  
                                                
310 M F Cassim op cit note 86 at 770. 
311 Ibid at 796. 
312 [Reference Cassim] 
313 First, the subsidiary company is formed solely for the purpose of acquiring the target company; 
secondly, the merger is effectively financed by the holding company.  
314 Section 20(9)(a). 
315 Section 20(9)(b). 
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Since s 20(9) gives the court a discretion to revoke the a company’s legal 
personality – evidenced by the use of the word ‘may’ in the section – it is likely that 
the court will take the general common law principles, relating to piercing the 
corporate veil, into account when deciding whether to utilise its power or not. Thus 
the courts will only disregard a company’s legal personality in exceptional 
circumstances: where the policy considerations favouring the preservation of the 
company’s legal personality are outweighed by the policy considerations favouring 
the piercing of the corporate veil.316 The use of the triangular merger, to avoid 
appraisal rights, constitutes such an exceptional circumstance: the policy 
consideration of providing minority shareholders with adequate protection in 
fundamental transactions, in light of their susceptibility to oppression due to the 
introduction of the M&A transaction, outweighs the preservation of the S Co’s 
separate legal personality. 
 
The avoidance of appraisal rights has proved common in jurisdictions that 
permit the use of the triangular merger structure. One may safely infer from cl 
119(2)(b) of the Companies Bill that the legislature did foresee that the triangular 
merger structure might be used to avoid the appraisal remedy; however, exactly why 
the legislature did not enact the clause remains an enigma when one considers the 
importance of protecting minority shareholders from majority oppression in light of 
the policy liberalisation. Nevertheless disenfranchised shareholders are not left 
destitute by the Act: they may effectively utilise the anti-avoidance provision or 
statutory veil piercing remedy to overcome the avoidance. It is advisable to pursue 
the anti-avoidance remedy before s 20(9) because the courts, once the requirements 
of the latter are fulfilled, still retain a discretion to revoke the company’s legal 
personality; and in the exercise of this discretion it is likely that the courts will 
continue to view veil piercing in light of the common law: a remedy of last resort for 
use in exceptional circumstance only. However, ss 6(1) & 20(9) shall only be 
effective provided the Commission or Tribunal takes on the proceedings; if none of 
them do, the enormous costs of the proceedings effectively debar the disenfranchised 
shareholders from access to their appraisal remedy. Accordingly, if the legislature is 
                                                
316 Cape Pacific note 293 supra at 803-4. 
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serious about the protection of minority shareholders, it should contemplate 
introducing a ‘parallel transactions’ provision for triangular M&A transactions – 
similar to the one contained in cl 119(2)(b) of the Companies bill . 
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VIII   CONCLUSION 
 
The history of the appraisal remedy, in the USA, indicates that it has served, and 
continues to serve, a variety of purposes, which simultaneously alter with changes in 
the utilisation of the M&A device. Nevertheless, the appraisal remedy has 
consistently been aimed at providing protection to minority shareholders of 
companies undergoing fundamental transactions.  
 
In the context of South African company law, the Act considerably 
liberalised fundamental transaction policy in the hope of growing the economy 
through the efficient facilitation of majority approved business combinations. The 
court-free nature of the M&A device, the permissibility of cash as merger 
consideration and the triangular merger structure all culminate to make minority 
shareholders highly susceptible to abuse and oppression by their dominant 
counterparts. Accordingly, in an attempt to balance the respective interests of 
minority and majority shareholders, the appraisal remedy was introduced in 
concomitance with the policy liberalisation. 
 
The appraisal remedy, as it currently stands, is hopelessly ineffective as the 
primary form of minority shareholder protection. First, the intricacies of the 
perfection procedure create enormous legal compliance costs for shareholders 
seeking appraisal – not to mention the time implications thereof. These exorbitant 
costs make the pursuit of appraisal impractical, if not impossible, for minority 
shareholders, as they generally do not have access to the vast sums of money 
required to fund appraisal. Secondly, the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the 
judicial determination of fair value, and the court’s discretion as to whom should 
bear the court costs, creates a fear in shareholders that, should a shareholder’s 
estimated fair value differ from the court’s one, he/she will have to bear the costs of 
the judicial appraisal proceedings. Thirdly, it is possible for merging companies to 
divest completely shareholders of their appraisal rights through the triangular merger 
structure. Accordingly, the ineffectiveness of the appraisal remedy in protecting 
minority shareholders draws a balance that favours the interests of majority 
shareholders over those of the minority shareholders.  
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In analogical terms, the minority and majority shareholders are gamblers 
betting on a boxing match that has been rigged by the legislature. The minority 
shareholders have no choice but to place their monetary interests on an inebriated 
lightweight (the appraisal remedy), whereas the majority shareholders place their 
monetary interests on the heavyweight champion of the fundamental transaction 
policy liberalisation (the M&A device). It is pretty patent whose interests are going 
to come out on top; however, all hope is not lost.  
 
It is possible to sober the intoxicated lightweight up, put some additional 
pounds on him and remove the legislature’s match fixing, in order to give the 
minority shareholders a run for their money. First, a ‘substantial compliance’ rule or 
‘harmless error’ defence for trivial non-compliance with the perfection procedure 
should be introduced. This will often negate the need for legal assistance and the 
associated legal costs. Secondly, the undisputed fair value of the shares should be 
prepaid to dissenting shareholders who pursue judicial appraisal: it provides them 
with cash, which might assist them in overcoming the initial costs of judicial 
appraisal. Thirdly, the company should be presumed to bear the costs of judicial 
appraisal proceedings. This will encourage pursuit of judicial appraisal since 
shareholders need not fear an adverse cost order, unless they act vexatiously or 
frivolously. Fourthly, the courts should adopt an open-ended approach to valuation, 
which takes all the relevant facts and the underlying rationale of the remedy into 
account. Finally, appraisal avoidance can be effectively challenged through the Act’s 
anti-avoidance provision (s 6(1)) or the veil piercing remedy (s 20(9)); however, 
these remedies will only be useful to disenfranchised shareholders if the Commission 
or Tribunal decides to take up the matter – otherwise the enormous costs of these 
proceedings shall ensure that these shareholders remain disenfranchised.  
 
For the appraisal remedy to be effective as the primary form of minority 
shareholder protection, in fundamental transactions, it is necessary that the entire 
remedy be extensively simplified. The knock-on benefits of this simplification, in the 
form of a significant reduction in costs and time consumption, will ensure that the 
remedy ascends a few weight divisions and packs a heavier punch against the 
heavyweight M&A device; ultimately giving the minority shareholder improved 
betting odds for their monetary interests. 
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